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ABSTRACT 
The contemporary military rivalry is driven mostly by the ongoing military 
technical revolution. In particular, the weapons used on the future battlefield will 
play an important role in military affairs. Which weapons can play a key role in 
the future? Electromagnetic weapons seem to involve key elements for the future 
battlefield; they offer advantages over conventional weaponry by providing 
nonlethality, the advantage of attack at the speed of light, fast engagement of 
multiple targets, potentially low operational cost, and wide-area coverage for 
offensive and defensive purposes. 
This thesis proposes hypothetical electromagnetic bombs (e-bomb) and 
classifies e-bombs into three isocategories depending on power sources. It also 
assesses the potential lethality effects on different targets based on a developed 
MATLAB Simulation Model. It also provides an understanding of the principles of 
High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) 
Weapons. In addition, a measure of effectiveness model is proposed to compare 
the hypothetical e-bomb, HEMP and HPM weapons. The strategic effects on 
military affairs will be assessed. Finally, this study will help the Turkish Armed 
Forces decide on investment in e-bomb research and development (R&D) to 
improve combat capabilities in the future battlefield. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The future battlefield will involve warfare using new generation weapons 
such as electromagnetic weapons. The increasing costs of conventional 
weapons, combined with the lethal effects on humans and the environment, 
leads global powers into the exploration of relatively cheap and nonlethal 
weapons. In addition, the increasing dependency of conventional weapons on 
command and control systems creates a weakness because the technology used 
in command and control system is mostly susceptible and vulnerable to 
electronic transient generated by electromagnetic weapons. This thesis proposes 
a new electromagnetic-bomb (e-bomb). 
An electronic bomb, or e-bomb, is a form of directed energy with potential 
for military utility. Even though the e-bomb currently is not completely described 
in open literature sources, sufficient information has been published about e-
bomb technology by directed energy researchers to support the general 
impression that electromagnetic weapons could be built. In this study, High 
Power Microwave (HPM) basic transmission theory will be used to define the 
characteristic of a hypothetical e-bomb. In addition, High Altitude Electromagnetic 
Pulse (HEMP) and HPM weapons will be also defined in order to assess the 
effectiveness of a proposed hypothetical e-bomb in comparison with other 
electromagnetic weapons. 
To show a wide range of different applications, source technologies and 
the range of effects on different targets, three types of e-bombs will be 
categorized and evaluated: 
• Low-Tech (Small) E-Bomb (intended to be used against unshielded 
systems) 
• Medium-Tech (Moderate) E-Bomb (intended to be used against 
moderately shielded systems, commercial aircrafts for example) 
 xiv
• High-Tech (Powerful) E-Bomb (intended to be used against fully 
shielded systems, such as military assets) 
The HPM theory, currently defined in open literature, will be used to 
assess the potential lethality and upset effect of a proposed e-bomb on electronic 
systems, This theory as described will also be the basis for MATLAB simulation 
calculation. Once the simulation model is generated, the High Intensity Radiated 
Field (HIRF) standards, which are established in order to define the maximum 
field strength in which commercial airplanes can safely fly, and the published 
damage threshold levels for representative electronic devices will be used as 
tools to validate the model. If the electric field strength, which is defined in HIRF 
standards as “severe” for commercial airplane for designated frequency, is 
proved to be sufficient to possibly damage the representative electronic devices, 
the model will be assumed as “validated.”  
Once the model is validated, the simulation will be run for each type of 
proposed e-bomb in order to assess the potential lethality against different kinds 
of targets.  
After assessing the effects of a proposed e-bomb, defense against e-
bombs and the military utility, including advantages and disadvantages, will be 
identified in order to evaluate the limitations and the potential benefits of 
hypothetical e-bombs. 
The next step in this thesis is to define the importance of the hypothetical 
e-bomb in military rivalry. The military rivalry mostly depends on military technical 
revolution. The weapons that will be used in the future battlefield will play an 
important role in military rivalry. Since the proposed e–bomb offers advantages 
over conventional weapons by providing a) nonlethality (no damage on humans), 
b) attack at the speed of light, c) fast engagement of multiple targets, d) potential 
low operational cost, and e) area coverage for offensive and defensive purposes, 
it is possible that the hypothetical e-bomb will be a key element for the battlefield 
of the future. 
 xv
Multiple, objective decision making provides a good methodology to 
assess the role of proposed e-bomb in military rivalry. Since the factors that 
affect the use/choice of a weapon instead of alternatives, are numerous and 
diverse, multiple, objective decision making will provide a better approach to 
compare similar weapons. In this study, one of the multiple, objective decision 
making methods, the “cost-effectiveness analysis,” will be used to compare the 
electromagnetic weapons. A “measure of effectiveness” model for 
electromagnetic weapons will be introduced. The model will mostly include 
qualitative measurement because there is not enough open source information 
available to define the attributes. Another limitation in this analysis is the cost 
estimation of such weapons. Since there is not enough source data to define the 
cost of each individual weapon, the cost issue in the analysis will be assumed 
equal. Even though such limitations exist, the output of the cost-effectiveness 
model will provide a good vision in order to assess the future benefits of 
proposed e-bomb. 
The implementation of such a weapon (potentially the weapon of the 
future battlefield), will definitely change the position of any military force in the 
military rivalry. Finally, under the assumptions made and conditions defined, the 
implementation of a hypothetical e-bomb to the Turkish Armed Forces will be 
analyzed. The potential benefits from such a weapon will be introduced and the 
reasons why the Turkish Armed Forces should invest in e-bomb research and 
development (R&D) will be identified. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A nation which does not practice science, such a nation, one must 
admit has no place in the high road of civilization. 
— Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
The founder and the first president of the Turkish Republic 
 
In 1232, during the battle of Kai-Keng, the Chinese repelled Mongol 
invaders with the first known use of rudimentary rockets powered 
by gunpowder, called “arrows of flying fire.” 
In 1914, employing automatic weapons, the German army rolled 
across Europe, dominating the cavalry and breech-loaded armies 
that made up the conventional forces of that era. 
On August 9, 1945, a lone American B-29 bomber flew over 
Nagasaki, Japan, and dropped a single atomic bomb that ended 
World War II. 
And in February 1991, precision-guided “smart” bombs, ground-
hugging cruise missiles, and invisible stealth fighters forced the 
massively equipped and much more numerous Iraqi army to its 
knees. 
In 2003, the conflict in Iraqi just missed seeing the introduction of a 
new generation of sophisticated weaponry. 
These overwhelming victories had one thing in common: They 
exploited technology to underpin a revolution in military affairs. 
Today the next revolution in military affairs is about to begin. But 
this revolution is not built on bombs or bullets, or anything you can 
hold in your hands. It comes from the same spectrum of energy 
found in a microwave, a light bulb, or a TV remote control. It is 
called Directed Energy (Beason, 2005).  
 2
A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
The next revolution in military affairs is about to begin. This revolution may 
have munitions whose effects are not kinetic, but may instead be based on 
directed and focused energy. An electronic bomb, or e-bomb, is a form of 
directed energy with potential for military utility. 
Even though the e-bomb is not completely described in open literature 
sources, directed energy researchers have published sufficient information about 
the underlying technology to indicate that electromagnetic weapons could be built 
(Kopp, 1993) (Kopp, 1996) (Benford, Swegle, and Schamiloglu, 2007). If so, the 
e-bomb has potential to change significantly the international correlation of 
forces. 
This thesis researches the technical aspects of the e-bomb, explores its 
potential capabilities, and assesses the effects on contemporary military rivalries. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
— Should Turkish Armed Forces invest in e-bomb research and 
development (R&D) to improve combat capabilities in the battlefield of the future? 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
— What is the e-bomb, what reasonable outputs can be expected and 
what are the soft kill and hard kill conditions associated with such a device? 
— What measures protect targets from e-bomb attack? 
— How does the e-bomb compare to other forms of high-power 
electromagnetic weaponry? 
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— What does a first order model for evaluating the Measure of 
Effectiveness (MOE) of different capability levels of e-bombs tell us about 
potential military utility? 
C. IMPORTANCE AND THE BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The results of this study may be used to support ongoing efforts by 
Turkish Armed Forces to apply electronic warfare and other countermeasures 
against modern threats. This thesis should enhance the perspective and 
knowledge of electronic warfare officers, technical personnel and policy makers. 
Furthermore, research and results will assist the Turkish Armed Forces in 
evaluating the needs and requirements of electronic warfare systems for the 
battlefield of the future. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is composed of six chapters. Chapter I provides an introduction 
to, and an overview of, new technology weapons of future battlefield, the 
electromagnetic-bomb. 
Chapter II presents the fundamental terminology for directed energy 
weapons and electromagnetic weapons, and provides the historical background 
for each of these weapons. In addition to providing the definitions in order to 
understand directed energy and electromagnetic weapons clearly, High Altitude 
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) weapons is 
briefly explained in order to compare them with the hypothetical e-bomb, which 
are discussed in Chapter III.  
Chapter III introduces three kinds of e-bombs, defines e-bomb theory, 
gives the specification for each class, and defines a MATLAB model used to 
simulate each type of e-bomb. It also validates the proposed simulation model 
according to a given scenario and evaluates a bound on the potential lethality 
range of each type of e-bomb based on the known susceptibility levels of possible 
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targets. In addition, countermeasures against e-bombs and the overall military 
utility of such a weapon are analyzed in this chapter.  
Chapter IV explains multiple objective decision methods, defines the 
estimation of measure of effectiveness of any system, proposes a measure of 
effectiveness model to compare electromagnetic weapons and evaluates the 
benefits of three electromagnetic weapons (HEMP, HPM and E-Bomb) according 
to the output of the model. Furthermore, potential advantages and attractiveness 
of the e-bomb are assessed, in comparison with other electromagnetic. 
Chapter V discusses the battlefield of the future, the importance of e-
bombs, the military rivalry at present and in the near future and the potential 
effect of an e-bomb in military affairs. Furthermore, this chapter answers the 
primary research question whether the Turkish Armed Forces should invest in e-
bomb research and development (R&D) to improve its combat capabilities in the 
battlefield of the future. 
Chapter VI presents the conclusion of the study and suggests 
recommendations for future thesis work. 
Figure 1 shows the outline of the thesis. 
 
Figure 1.   Thesis Roadmap 
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II. TERMINOLOGY 
I am not leaving a spiritual legacy of dogmas, unchangeable 
petrified directives. My spiritual legacy is science and reason. ... 
What I wanted to do and what I tried to achieve for the Turkish 
nation is quite evident. If those people who wish to follow me after I 
am gone take the reason and science as their guides they will be 
my true spiritual heirs. 
— Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
A. BACKGROUND 
An electronic bomb, or e-bomb, is a form of directed energy device with 
potential for military applications. Even though the e-bomb currently is not 
completely described in open literature sources, sufficient information has been 
published (Kopp, 1993) (Kopp, 1996) (Benford, Swegle, and Schamiloglu, 2007) 
about e-bomb technology by directed energy researchers to indicate that 
electromagnetic weapons could be built. 
Directed Energy research originated with research work done to determine 
the impact to important military systems operating in harsh electromagnetic 
environments. One of the most threatening and pervasive of all electromagnetic 
threats is that due to electromagnetic pulses. 
The electromagnetic pulse produced by a high-altitude nuclear detonation 
can induce electrical stresses (currents, voltages, or charge) on and within 
systems. These HEMP induced stresses can damage or severely disrupt some 
electronic systems, which are sensitive to transient disturbance. Significant 
potential damaging effects can occur at long ranges to virtually all systems 
located within line-of-sight of the detonation point.  
The first electromagnetic pulse effect was observed during a high altitude 
airburst nuclear weapons testing. As a result of the test, a very short but 
extremely intense electromagnetic pulse was observed. This pulse propagated 
away from its source with a decreasing intensity, which is also to be expected 
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according to the theory of electromagnetism. Carlo Kopp, a prominent Australian 
freelance defense analyst and academic, defined this electromagnetic pulse as 
“an electromagnetic shock wave” (Kopp, 1993). An unclassified representation of 
the electromagnetic pulse normalized amplitude versus the pulse duration for the 
e-bomb available in the open literature (Kopp, 1996) is shown in Figure 2 and 
contrasted with those of the unclassified representation of the nuclear 
electromagnetic pulse  transient and a typical lightning stroke. It can be seen in 
this plot that the Flux Compression Generator, that is intended to be one of the 
power sources for the proposed e-bomb and will be explained later, share similar 
spectral content with a nuclear electromagnetic transient and lightning stroke. 
The higher pulsewidth of Flux Compression Generator can also provide extra 
advantages such as better coupling efficiency. However, it may be disadvantage 
since it causes less atmospheric breakdown level than others. The technical 
detail will be explained in later chapters. 
Taylor and Giri, the authors of a book named: “High Power Microwave 
Systems and Effects,” mention about an interesting example of electromagnetic 
effect in their book: 
A tragic example of the effects on electronics from high power 
microwave (HPM) illumination occurred on the U.S. aircraft carrier 
Forrestal on July 29, 1967. At that time, the Forrestal was cruising 
off the coast of North Vietnam. It’s A-4 Skyhawk jets had flown 
more than 700 sorties. A number of A-4’s were on the deck, fully 
fueled and loaded with 1000-lb bombs, air-to-ground missiles, and 
air-to-air missiles. One of the missile cables apparently had an 
improperly, mounted shielded connector. When it was illuminated 
by a shipboard radar, RF voltages were developed in the degraded 
connector which resulted in a missile being fired across the deck 
and striking another aircraft. Secondary explosions of aircraft, 
bombs, and missiles did $72 million of damage, with 134 men lost 
or missing (Taylor and Giri, 1996). 
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Figure 2.   Typical Electromagnetic Pulse Shape (Kopp, 1996) 
On March 25,  2003, CBS News reported that  
The U.S. Air Force hit Iraqi TV with an experimental 
electromagnetic pulse device called the “E-Bomb” in an attempt to 
knock it off the air and shut down Saddam Hussein’s propaganda 
machine. The highly classified bomb created a brief pulse of 
microwaves powerful enough to fry computers, blind radar, silence 
radios, trigger crippling power outages and disable the electronic 
ignitions in vehicles and aircraft. Officially, the Pentagon does not 
acknowledge the weapon’s existence. Asked about it at a March 5 
news conference at the Pentagon, Gen. Tommy Franks did not 
confirm this news (CBS News, 2003). 
Carlo Kopp published the only open-literature studies about the e-bomb. 
In 1993, he defined a doctrine for the use of such devices, and then, in 1996, he 
introduced the technical and operational aspects of the e-bomb. 
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E-Bomb studies are heavily classified, and research surrounding them is 
highly secret. The nature of that information protection will affect the contents 
and analysis involved in this open source thesis effort.  
B. DIRECTED ENERGY AND DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS (DEW) 
1. Key Definitions 
Directed Energy (DE): An umbrella term covering technologies that relate 
to the production of a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or 
subatomic particles (Joint Publication 1-02, 161) (Deveci, 2007). 
Directed-Energy Warfare (DEW): Military action involving the use of 
directed-energy weapons, devices, and countermeasures to either cause direct 
damage or destruction of enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel, or to 
determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum through damage, destruction, and disruption. It also includes actions 
taken to protect friendly equipment, facilities, and personnel, as well as retain 
friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum (Joint Publication 1-02, 161) 
(Deveci, 2007) 
Directed-Energy Weapon: A system using directed energy primarily as a 
direct means to damage or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel 
(Joint Publication 1-02, 162) (Deveci, 2007). 
The Electronic Warfare (EW) in the existing century is different from the 
traditional, old way of EW. In the new way, the defensive part of EW includes the 
offensive actions such as preventing the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum through counter measures such as damaging, disrupting, or destructing 
the enemy’s electromagnetic capability. DEW is considered to be as the 
representative of the new way of EW (Schleher, 1999). 
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2. Directed Energy Weapon Systems 
Directed energy weapons include four types of weapons: high-energy 
lasers (HEL), charged particle beams (CPB), neutral particle beams (NPB), and 
High Power Microwaves (HPM). The most common characteristic of these 
weapons is that they attack at the speed-of-light. This helps in defeating targets 
such as theater and ballistic missiles before they can deploy defense-saturating 
sub-munitions. Another advantage of such weapons is that they can be used 
against multiple targets at the same time. Among all four weapon categories, 
HEL systems have the most potential for military technical revolution in order to 
be applied in both strategic defenses and tactical battlefield (Schleher, 1999). 
HPM technology, which will be base for the proposed e-bomb in this study, has 
similar potential also, but since it has not been as well funded and is accordingly 
less well developed, the technology for it seems behind that of lasers. On the 
other hand, particle beam weapons are still in the science fiction domain, as the 
weight and cost do not yet justify the weaponization (Kopp, 2006). 
In this study, the e-bomb is defined as a kind of directed energy weapon. 
Even though the technical specifications of the e-bomb are based on the HPM 
technology, the means of e-bomb delivery differs from that of HPM. To 
understand the military utility of the e-bomb better and show the advantages and 
disadvantages of it, e-bomb will be assumed as the third electromagnetic 
weapon after HPM and High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP). The 
rationale is the similarities perceived between these technologies and the 
absence of any open-literature e-bomb data. 
3. Directed Energy Weapon Concepts 
Kopp has recently published an article about Directed Energy Weapons. 
In that article, he defines the Directed Energy Weapons basically as:  
Directed Energy Weapons share the concept of delivering a large 
amount of stored energy from the weapon to the target, to produce 
structural and incendiary damage effects. The fundamental 
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difference is that a DEW delivers its effect at the speed of light, 
rather than supersonic or subsonic speeds typical of projectile 
weapons (Kopp, 2006). 
DEWs have great potential for aircraft operations since crews can 
enhance their own survivability in the battlefield, where the aircrafts are 
susceptible and vulnerable to missile threats, by protecting themselves with 
electromagnetic shields. In such environment, DEW systems may prevent the 
aircraft from threats by decreasing the detection and targeting capability of 
enemy. They may also aid in hit avoidance by deflecting, blinding, or causing the 
incoming missile to break lock and finally, where necessary, to destroy the 
missile itself before it reaches its target. An additional approach might be to 
defeat the fusing system of the incoming missile (Schleher, 1999). 
There are still two fundamental problems shared by Directed Energy 
Weapons. These problems are defined as “getting the projectile to successfully 
travel a useful distance and hit the target,” and then “produce useful damage 
effects” (Kopp, 2006). 
C. ELECTROMAGNETIC WEAPONS 
As mentioned above, three electromagnetic weapons will be defined in 
this study: High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP), High Power Microwave 
(HPM) Weapons, and Electromagnetic Bomb (e-bomb).  
Even though e-bomb can be considered same as HPM weapons based on 
underlying technology, this study will assume that these two weapons are 
different due to means of delivery.  
HEMP is not a directed energy weapon. The reason why HEMP is defined 
as an electromagnetic weapon is that it produces similar effects in 
electromagnetic spectrum and can cause similar impacts on electronic devices. 
In later sections, e-bomb utility will be evaluated in comparison with HPM and 
HEMP. 
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1. High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) 
High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is an instantaneous 
electromagnetic energy field produced in the upper atmosphere by the radiation 
of a nuclear detonation. The potential damage of HEMP on the electronic devices 
over a very wide area is dependent on the detonation altitude and the structural 
design of the nuclear device. As mentioned in the definition of the HEMP, a 
nuclear weapon detonated high above the Earth’s surface is required to produce 
HEMP. In such way, the gamma-radiation is created that interacts with the 
atmosphere to create an instantaneous and intense electromagnetic energy field 
that does not damage the people as it radiates outward from the burst, but which 
can overload computer circuitry with effects similar to, but causing damage much 
more swiftly than a lightning strike (Wilson, 2006).  
A test at the Pacific Ocean introduced the HEMP effects to the U.S. in 
1962. The following observation was reported: 
On July 8, 1962, at about 11:00 pm Hawaiian time, a nuclear 
detonation occurred 400 km above Johnston Atoll in the Pacific 
Ocean during a high-altitude nuclear test conducted by the U.S. 
under the code name “Starfish Prime.” Approximately 800 miles 
from ground zero on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, 30 strings of 
street lights failed simultaneously at about the time of the Starfish 
shot” (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).  
After the explosion, Vittitoe who examined the Hawaiian street light 
incident, concluded that failure was caused by the electromagnetic pulse 
generated by the nuclear detonation. He concluded that “Although the peak 
amplitude of the electromagnetic pulse was relatively small, the orientation of the 
street light circuits with respect to the incident electromagnetic pulse angle 
allowed a coherent buildup of surges which resulted in blown fuses” (Vittitoe, 
1988). When it is considered that the distance of the epicenter of the blasts is 
800 miles from Honolulu, the 5.6 kV/m (kilovolts per meter) peak electric field 
estimated over Honolulu gives a good interpretation about how powerful HEMP 
can be (Longmire, 1985). 
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The HEMP effect can span thousands of miles, depending on the altitude 
as well as the design and yield of the nuclear burst (a single device detonated at 
an appropriate altitude over Kansas reportedly could affect all of the continental 
United States), HEMP can be picked up by metallic conductors such as wires or 
power cables, acting as antennas conducting the energy shockwave into the 
electronic systems of valued cars, airplanes, and communication (Wilson, 2006). 
 
Figure 3.   Estimated Area Affected by HEMP (Spencer, Heritage Foundation, 
2000) 
Since the electromagnetic pulse damage on unprotected electronic 
devices is limited by the blast’s “line of sight,” the altitude of the explosion 
determines the size of the affected area in harm’s way. The higher the altitude, 
the greater the land area affected. Figure 3 shows the estimated affected area by 
such a HEMP. According to this figure, the HEMP produced by a single large 
nuclear weapon, detonated 125 miles (200 km) above the center of the 
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continental United States, would reach more than half of the country;  a weapon 
detonated at 250 miles (400 km) would reach the entire country, though at lower 
pulse intensities.  
Modern weapons with higher gamma-ray yields coupled with higher 
geomagnetic fields over the central U.S. could produce electromagnetic pulse 
with intense fields on the order of tens of kilovolts per meter (Kruse, Nickel, 
Taylor, Bonk and Barnes, 1991). For example, a one- or two-megaton device 
detonated at an altitude of 250 miles would reportedly produce a field strength of 
10-50 kV/m, enough to produce extensive damage to electronics over the entire 
continental U.S. (Miller, 2005). Since HEMP is electromagnetic radiation traveling 
at the speed of light, the entire area could possibly be affected almost 
simultaneously. All communications, television, radio, cars, trucks, planes, etc., 
could be reached, resulting in an Electronic blanket where all electronics in the 
states could be affected (Spencer, Heritage Foundation). 
Even though HEMP seems a major threat on electronic equipments, there 
are some challenges in generating such weapons. It is quite difficult and 
expensive, since it requires the ability to field both a nuclear weapon and a 
delivery system to get it to altitude. It must be noted that HEMP occurs for 
nuclear detonations above 25 miles and is most effective above approximately 
70 miles. The higher the burst is, the more widespread the effect due to line of 
sight. Currently, the U.S., Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, 
Pakistan, and Israel have the capability to produce HEMP, and 11 other 
countries have similar potential, either due to indigenous weapons programs or 
arms trading (Miller, 2005). 
2. High Power Microwave Weapons 
High Power Microwave (HPM) is an imprecise term used by several 
communities studying generation of coherent electromagnetic radiation spanning 
the frequency range of 1 GHz to over 100 GHz. One interpretation of the term is 
high-average-power microwaves, which implies long-pulse duration, high 
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repetition rate or continuous beam source. Another interpretation is high-peak-
power microwaves, which implies short-pulse duration, a low-repetition rate or 
“single-shot” source (Barker and Schamiloglu, 2001). 
HPM in this thesis includes the features of HEMP and lightning. This is 
done intentionally to capitalize on the vast body of knowledge available for these 
two intense electromagnetic threats. Where necessary, the various 
electromagnetic threats will be contrasted to point out their inherent differences. 
In various countries, High-power microwaves (HPM) operating in a single-
shot or with tens or hundreds of Hz repetition rates are being developed. In 
addition to their frequency agility, they have been reached the power level at in 
the GW range (Giri, 2004). Since the power levels of HPM sources have been 
reached to GW levels, the application of HPM technology as a weapon for 
defense has been quite an interest for military purposes. It was realized that such 
applications may disrupt or even destroy the electronic systems of offensive 
weapons such as missiles (Giri, 2004). 
Until the 1980s, various analysts working in HPM technology had 
considered using microwave radiation as a weapon as well as for 
communications and detection. Since damage thresholds levels of representative 
electronic devices were high when compared to available microwave output 
power (kilowatts) by that time, the use of HPM technology as a weapon was not 
in the interest of the analysts. Then, two new technological advents changed this 
belief. First, the source development of microwave power in the Gigawatt range 
posed a plausible threat to military equipment. Second, the military grew 
increasingly dependent on microelectronics that were susceptible to large voltage 
transients at much lower power levels than their predecessors. These two 
developments made analysts begin to believe that along with the rapid advance 
of pulsed power technology, HPM might play an important role for the battlefield 
of the future. These devices might have a use in traditional Electronic Warfare 
(EW) missions. They can be used as a jammer against the enemy radar, and 
command and control systems. But this is not all they might accomplish. They 
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might also disable or disrupt the enemy aircraft and missiles in the air or on the 
ground. This utility provides  a wide variety of offensive and defensive missions. 
HPM uses could range from air base defense, aircraft self-protection, and 
suppression of enemy air defenses, attacks on airfields, imprecisely located or 
“strategic relocatable” targets (mobile missiles and command posts), and 
satellites (Barker and Schamiloglu, 2001).  
The potential effects of a designed HPM weapon strongly depends on the 
electromagnetic properties of the target. Since it is difficult to get the required 
intelligence, the complexity of real systems poses technical difficulties (Giri, 
2004). 
The recent comparison of HEMP and HPM resulted in a published report. 
The spectra of the Source Region electromagnetic pulse and of the lightning are 
shown on Figure 4. The following conclusion was made: 
The low level electromagnetic signals covering the whole spectrum 
represent the various electromagnetic interferences due to all kind 
of sources and which are the most common electromagnetic 
environment today. It can be seen that the HEMP and HPM present 
a similar shape, but that: 
• the frequency of 300 MHz represents the maximum 
significant value for HEMP, but it is the minimum value for 
HPM; 
• the amplitude of the HEMP signal is about one order of 
magnitude higher than the signal produced by an HPM 




HIRF : High Intensity Radiated Field 
UWP/SP : Ultra Wide-Band/Short Pulse 
EMI Environments : Electromagnetic Interference Environments 
HPEM : Emerging High Power Electromagnetic 
Figure 4.   Comparison of the Spectral Density of Several Types of EM 
Environments (Giri and Tesche, 2004) 
A typical HPM weapon system basically includes a prime source that 
generates the intended power, an RF generator, a system that shapes and forms 
the wave into the intended form, a waveguide through which the generated wave 
travel, an antenna that propagated the wave, and the control unit that manages 
all the steps (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.   HPM Weapon System 
For this study, the following three items are considered the basic elements 
used to explain the theory for HPM weapon systems: 
• HPM power supply 
• Waveguide 
• Antenna/reflector 
Each of these parts limits the design in some way and affects the other 
parts.  
a. HPM Power Supply 
The operating principles of various microwave sources are 
presented in this section. 
(1) Klystron. The klystron is a high-frequency oscillator 
and amplifier that was invented in the late 1930s by R. H. Varian and S. F. 
Varian. The output capabilities of modern klystron tubes are steadily being 
improved. In general, klystrons provides high pulse and continuous wave (CW) 




efficiencies (up to 70%) can be achieved. Efficiency refers to what fraction of the 
input DC power for CW sources is converted into microwave power (Taylor and 
Giri, 1994). 
(2) Magnetrons. The magnetron is a self-contained 
microwave oscillator that operates differently from the linear-beam tubes, such as 
the klystron. crossed-electron and magnetic fields are used in the magnetron to 
produce the high-power output required in radar and communications equipment 
(Buczynski, 2003). The magnetron tube was perfected before the klystron and is 
the more widely used device for power oscillator applications. In the late 1970s, 
100-MW pulsed magnetrons and klystrons became commercially available. 
However, a relativistic magnetron source in the L band producing 1.8 GW of 
peak power is now commercially available (Taylor and Giri, 1994). 
(3) Gyrotrons. The gyrotron is a new type of microwave 
device that operates at millimeter wavelengths. For these devices, the electron 
beam is normally a thin hollow cylinder configuration and is directed into a strong 
axial magnetic field inside a circular cylindrical cavity. Some reported output 
powers from gyrotron oscillators under pulse operation are 800 MW at 7.5 GHz, 
350 MW at 15 GHz, and 8 MW at 37.5 GHz (Taylor and Giri, 1994). 
(4) Vircators. The virtual cathode oscillator, or vircator, is 
a high-power source capable of operation within the frequency range of a few 
hundred megahertz to tens of gigahertz. Very high outputs (up to 20 GW) have 
been reported for the vircator. Pulse lengths of ten to several hundred 
nanoseconds can be produced. Usually the pulse length is controlled by the 
electrical pulse driving the anode, although other factors are involved (Taylor and 
Giri, 1994). 
Vircator is the most appropriate device among all other HPM 
sources in terms of use in munition applications. Since it is simple in design,  
relatively cheap in production and capable of generating tens of Gigawatts of 
power, these features attract significant interest of electromagnetic weapon world 
(Kopp, 1996). 
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Figure 6 shows an axial virtual cathode oscillator defined by 
Kopp. The detailed information about the vircator can be found in open literature 
and is beyond the purpose of this study. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Vircator (Kopp, 1996)  
 
(5) Ubitron/Free-Electron Lasers. The ubitron is a device 
that uses an electron beam directed past a set of periodically spaced magnets 
where the electron velocities are near the speed of light. Output power levels 
exceeding 1 GW have been reported (Taylor and Giri, 1994). 
 (6) Klystronlike Intense Relativistic Electron Beam 
Devices. Generally, these devices have a low efficiency. The so-called intense 
relativistic electron beam device incorporates a converter to achieve high 
efficiencies in the conversion of electron kinetic energy into electrical energy. 
Recent simulation studies have been performed on the design of such devices.  
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The simulation results show that for a very large diameter (26 cm) intense beam 
(466 keV, 100 kA), it appears that 31 GW of RF beam power can be developed 
at 1.3 GHz (Taylor and Giri, 1994). 
In order to be considered a viable source for a high-power 
microwave weapon, a device should provide an output power that exceeds 1 GW 
(Benford, 1987). A comparison of the outputs from these devices is shown in 
Figure 7. It can be seen that a vircator can be the best performing power source 
for 1 GHz frequency, where a magnetron has better performance for 3 GHz. 
According to desired frequency level, other power sources can be considered as 




Figure 7.   Comparison of Device Peak-Power Generation (Taylor and Giri, 
1994) 
b. Waveguide 
Waveguides are metallic transmission lines that act as a duct for 
propagating microwave radiation typically to interconnect transmitters/receivers 
with antennas. They also act as a radiating element without an antenna for 
electromagnetic waves at microwave frequencies (i.e., open-ended waveguide). 
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In this study, every design of electromagnetic weapon will include 
only rectangular waveguides. There are two independent classes of waveguides: 
Transfer Magnetic (TM) modes and Transverse Electric (TE) modes. 
A conducting waveguide operating in the lowest-order transverse 
electric (TE) mode is often used in transitioning a sinusoidal electromagnetic 
wave from source to radiating antenna. Extending this concept to pyramidal 
horns, waves can be launched from one or more waveguide/sources (Taylor and 
Giri, 1994).  
The most important problem of waveguide use in HPM weapons is 
the maximum field strength that a waveguide filled with air can propagate 
(around 3 MV/m). However, a proven method is used to overcome this problem. 
That is vacuuming the waveguide and filling with appropriate gas. If the 
waveguide is operated under high-vacuum conditions, it can propagate very 
large electric fields. In order to bring the power out of the waveguide, the fields 
need to be reduced below the dielectric strength of the ambient medium (air or 










(RCSC) U.S. (EIA)** 
 0.96 - 1.45 7.7 x 3.85 195.58 x 97.79 R12 WG5 WR770 
 1.12 - 1.7 6.5 x 3.25 165.10 x 82.55 R14 WG6 WR650 
 1.45 - 2.2 5.1 x 2.55 129.54 x 64.77 R18 WG7 WR510 
 1.7 – 2.6 4.3 x 2.15 109.22 x 54.61 R22 WG8 WR430 
 2.2 – 3.3 3.4 x 1.7 86.36 x 43.18 R26 WG9A WR340 
*IEC : International Electrotechnical Commission 
**EIA : Electronic Industry Association 
Table 1.   Rectangular Waveguide Specifications (Microwave Encyclopedia, 




Table 1 shows the waveguide dimensions and designations for the 
interested frequencies. This table will be the main source to decide what kind of 
waveguide will be used in design of e-bomb in later chapters. More detailed 
waveguide features are listed in Appendix A. 
c. Antenna/Reflector 
A traditional way of illuminating a reflector horn for a narrow band 
CW signal is by a pyramidal horn. The pyramidal horn and the reflector have to 
work in conjunction to produce the desired radiation patterns (Giri, 2004). 
Another way to propagate the wave is to use a parabolic dish antenna. In later 
chapters, the e-bomb model will include either the pyramidal horn antenna or a 
parabolic dish antenna. 
3. Electromagnetic Bomb (E-Bomb) 
An electronic bomb, or e-bomb, is a form of directed energy with potential 
military applications. In this study, HPM basic transmission theory is used to 
define the characteristic of hypothetical e-bomb. 
The use of HPM warheads on precision guided munitions is an attractive 
coupling of electronic attacks with precision guided munitions (PGMs) and 
includes such platforms as accurate missiles, glidebombs, and unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs). Carlo Kopp, who coined the term E-bomb in 1995, when the 
U.S Air Force originally published his work, envisioned combining a smart bomb 
with a HPM warhead (Benford, Swegle and Schamiloglu, 2007). 
Kopp in his article mentions about the electromagnetic pulse as “an 
electromagnetic shock wave.” This pulse produces a powerful electromagnetic 
field, particularly within the vicinity of the weapon burst that can be sufficiently 
strong to produce short duration transient voltages of several of kilo volts on 
exposed electrical devices that include conductors, wires, or conductive tracks on 
printed circuit boards (Kopp, 1993). 
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He also defined the Flux Compression Generators (FCGs) and HPM 
devices, especially vircator, as the key technologies which may be used in e-
bomb technology (Kopp, 1996). HPM devices (and vircators) are mentioned 
previously in this report as special systems offering unique performance 
(frequency, amplitude, power) features. These devices are not commonly 
available. On the other hand, FCG is defined in the open literature as a mature 
technology. FCGs can produce peak electrical energies of megajoules in tens to 
hundreds of microseconds. These performance attributes make FCG technology 
appealing for e-bomb consideration at high frequencies. The biggest advantage 
with respect to usage for e-bomb is that the FCGs can be compact and generate 
power in TerraWatts or tens of TerraWatts (Kopp, 1996). As designed by Kopp, 
Figure 8 shows the detailed technical parts and the discharge picture versus time 
for helical FCG.  
Since the effectiveness of the flux generator is limited because of the 
coupling efficiency of a low frequency pulse, and low-frequency pulses are 




Figure 8.   Flux Compression Generator (Kopp, 1996) 
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A vircator/antenna combination defined by Kopp is shown in Figure 9.  
Especially a circularly polarized wideband antenna application in an e-bomb 
design would require a tapered helix or conical spiral antenna in order to provide 
a better application for large power with minimal losses. 
 
Figure 9.   Vircator/Antenna Combination (Kopp, 1996) 
An e-bomb design will include consideration about the delivery system 
options available. The weapon may dictate the delivery system, or alternatively 
the delivery system constraints may heavily influence the e-bomb design. 
Delivery system considerations are very important. 
The massed application of such electromagnetic weapons in the opening 
phase of an electronic battle delivered at the proper instant or location can 
quickly lead the superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum. This package might 
mean a major shift from physically lethal weaponry to electronically lethal attacks 
(via e-bombs) as a preferred mode of operation. Potential platforms for such 
weapons delivery systems are the U.S. Air Force-deployed global positioning 
system (GPS) aided munition on the B-2 bomber and the GPS/internally guided 
GBU-29/30 JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) and the AGM-154 JSOW (Joint 
Stand Off Weapon) glidebomb. The attractiveness of glidebombs delivering HPM 
warheads is that the weapon can be released from outside the effective radius of 
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target air defenses, minimizing the risk to the launch aircraft, which can stay clear 
of the bomb’s electromagnetic effects (Benford, Swegle and Schamiloglu, 2007). 
Kopp proposed two delivery methods, both include the Mk.84 warhead 
delivery form (shown in Figure 10 and 11). GPS guided bombs and AGW 
glidebombs are intended to be used by this type of delivery. One of the Mk.84 
designs that he proposed includes a pure helical FCG and coaxial short circuit 
load. His second design concept includes a vircator tube feeding a conical horn 
for the second stage of the bomb. Both designs can be seen in Figure 10 and 
Figure 11 respectively.  
 
Figure 10.   MK.84 E-Bomb Warhead (Kopp, 1996) 
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Figure 11.   MK.84 HPM E-Bomb Warhead (Kopp, 1996) 
Another delivery method of e-bomb may be the use of UAVs. The 
technology of UAVs is still developing and partly immature; however, 
improvements can be expected in the next decade. 
The e-bomb targets mission essential electronic systems such as the 
computers used in data processing systems, communications systems, displays, 
industrial control applications, including road and rail signaling, and those 
embedded in military equipment, such as signal processors, electronic flight 
controls and digital engine control systems (Kopp, 1996). 
When e-bomb outputs are too weak to destroy these systems but strong 
enough to disrupt their operations, system performance can be degraded. On the 
other hand, and when intense fields are involved, these targeted electronic 
devices and electrical equipment may also be destroyed by the electromagnetic 
pulse effect. Since new technology diodes, integrated circuits, transistors, and 
microprocessors are getting more and more vulnerable and sensitive to 
electromagnetic transients, any device that includes these devices can be 
potential target for e-bombs. This study will also attempt to assess whether an e-
bomb could, potentially, be a major threat against complex systems such as 
commercial airplanes, military aircraft, or other military systems.  
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Figure 12.   An e-bomb delivery method  (Kopp, 1996) 
Figure 12 shows the relation between the altitude where the e-bomb is 
detonated and a representation of the lethality range. Target information (to 
include location and vulnerability) becomes an important issue. If the lethality 
range for the specific target is estimated, the optimum detonation altitude for a 
known device yield can be calculated in order to provide the maximum lethality 
footprint as shown. If the target systems are located in relatively narrow area like 
in Figure 13, a higher detonation altitude can be implemented while still covering 
the entire footprint, while keeping the delivery platform well out of the stand-off 




Figure 13.   Delivery method of e-bomb (Kopp, 1996) 
A significant problem with the delivery of e-bomb as either “guided” or 
“dumb” bombs is required accuracy. A GPS aided bomb uses a smart tailkit 
equipped with an internal navigation package and a GPS receiver, which provide 
such weapons with a circular error probably between 6 and 12 meters. Such 
weapons are fully autonomous, all-weather capable, and employ intelligent 
guidance algorithms, which allow the weapon to engage the target with a 
preprogrammed trajectory (Kopp, 1996). Dumb bombs, on the other hand, have 
a great deal of inaccuracy involved in their delivery. 
Because of the simplicity of the e-bomb in comparison to weapons such 
as Anti Radiation Missiles (ARMs), it is not unreasonable to expect that they 
should be cheaper to manufacture and easier to support in the field, thus 
allowing for more substantial weapon stocks (Kopp, 1993). 
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III. HYPOTHETICAL ELECTROMAGNETIC BOMB 
Directed energy is not a science fiction. These are real weapons 
being tested in real scenarios… And those nations that are not 
prepared to exploit directed energy will stagnate or even worse, 
lose, by clinging to outmoded traditional forms of warfare. They will 
fall behind, just as civilizations that clung to the bow and arrow lost 
to the rifle and just as bullets and bombs will fall to DEW…(Beason, 
2005) 
   — Doug BEASON, PhD 
In this chapter, HPM theory and the general design principles introduced 
in the previous chapter are to define a notional e-bomb. Our e-bomb includes an 
HPM power source, appropriate waveguide, and an antenna/reflector. The pulse 
generated by the HPM source follows a rectangular wave shape. 
 
Figure 14.   E-Bomb major elements 
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First, the theory behind HPM technology is defined. Next, the device 
radiated output is described and used to define the propagation pattern of 
generated electromagnetic field to ill be estimated as a function of range. Then, 
the coupling mechanisms between the HPM device output and the target system 
are defined. After defining the yield for the conception e-bomb from an HPM 
source, the impact on electronic systems is considered. The basis for 
consideration is according to the known, published threshold values of electronic 
systems. The possible effects are analyzed and the potential lethality range for 
different targets is estimated. A flow diagram of the described process is shown 
in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.   The e-bomb microwave flow from the power source to the 
damage/upset of target system. 
To support the interaction assessment, a MATLAB model is used to 
simulate e-bomb effects using HPM theory. Published data for relevant systems 
is then used to validate the model.  
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Finally, defense against e-bomb are considered, and the 
advantages/disadvantages of different types of e-bomb design features are 
evaluated in terms of the military utility. 
A. NOTIONAL PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES 
1. Specifications 
For our model, a frequency range between 0.5 GHz and 3 GHz is used. 
The reason to choose this range is that the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) region 
from 300 MHz to 3 GHz is extensively populated with radars, television 
broadcasting and mobile communications involving aircraft and surface vehicles. 
For most military operations environments, collateral effects on important use 
civilian systems is unacceptable, and should be avoided. 
According to the described frequency range, an appropriate rectangular 
waveguide is chosen from Table 1. If there is more than one appropriate 
waveguide for the specified frequency range, the one with greater dimensions in 
size is used, since it provides a better field strength in far field. It also provides 
relatively lower field strength in the waveguide, which avoids the field strength 
exceeding the atmospheric breakdown limit (leading to ionization instead of 
propagation). 
 
Figure 16.   Rectangular waveguide 
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For the simulation model, the frequency ( f ) and the duration of the 
microwave pulse/pulsewidth (τ ) will be decided by the user. For the purpose of 
this study, 100 nanoseconds (ns) is chosen as the default pulsewidth to make 
relevant but meaningful comparison between the different classes of e-bomb. For 
frequencies at or above 1 GHz frequency, 100 ns pulsewidth will contain 100 
cycles and from an interaction viewpoint, 100 cycles should be adequate to ring 
up most system resonances, resulting in a steady-state maximum signal (voltage 
or current) at the failure port (Taylor and Giri, 1994). 
 
Figure 17.   Waveguide dimensions 
As seen on Figure 17, let the inner dimensions of the waveguide be : 
 a: larger dimension of the waveguide 
 b: smaller dimension of the waveguide. 
Since a>b, the TE10 mode has the lowest cutoff frequency, it is generally 
desirable to have only one propagating mode in the waveguide. This minimizes 
dispersion and allows more efficient operation of the waveguide (Taylor and Giri, 
1994). 













ZZ λ                                        (1) 
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where 
 0Z  : wave impedance of free space ( πεμ 120/ = ) 
 λ  : operating wavelength (
f
c=λ , where the c is the  
    speed of light in free space, 3x108 m/s) 
 a  : larger dimension of the waveguide (Taylor and Giri, 
1994). 
For our e-bomb simulation, the dimensions of the waveguide are entered 
by the user. Free space wave impedance will be reference impedance in the 
simulation as shown in equation (1). 
Once the model impedance is determined, the peak electric field (E-field) 
in the waveguide is given by: 
avgPZab
waveguideE 0,1max
4)( =                                                (2) 
where 
 0,1Z  : model impedance of waveguide 
 avgP  : average power of HPM source 
 a  : larger dimension of the waveguide 
 b  : smaller dimension of the waveguide (Taylor and Giri, 
1994) (Giri and Tesche, 2003) (Giri, 2004). 
For the simulation, the average power will be entered by the user in terms 
of the classifications of e-bomb, which will be defined later in this chapter. 
Another issue for HPM propagation is the atmospheric breakdown 
limitations. The upper limit of microwave power that can be transmitted in a 
waveguide and in the air is determined by the dielectric strength of the medium in 
which the microwave pulse propagates. As a rule of thumb, 3 MV/m maximum 
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field strength is assumed the maximum field strength that the atmosphere can 
propagate. The upper limit of the breakdown field strength depends on the 
pulsewidth. A simplified expression for the critical electric field strength, 
bdE [V/m], for dielectric breakdown of a microwave pulse in air at atmospheric 





τppEbd                                             (3) 
where 
 p  : ambient pressure in pascals 
 τ  : pulsewidth of microwave.  
Obviously, if the pulsewidth is increased, the breakdown field strength will 
decrease. In the e-bomb simulation, 1013.25 hectopascal (hPa) will be used 
since it is the average atmospheric pressure at sea level on the earth (see Figure 
18 which shows the breakdown field strength as a function of air pressure for 
different pulsewidths).  













































Figure 18.   The critical electric field strength for different pulsewidths 
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For the standard atmospheric conditions (1013.25 hPa), the maximum 
field strength that can propagate in the atmosphere is around 3.10 MV/m for 100 
ns. pulsewidth (the standard pulsewidth for the simulation). 
The breakdown limitation formula shown in equation (3) is valid for air 
only. The waveguide may be filled with different inert gas, for example sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6), which has a critical field strength level of 3-4 times that of air 
at microwave frequencies (Larsson, Johansson, and Nyholm, 2006). 
Combinations of SF6 and Nitrogen (N2) have also proved valuable when working 
with pulse power technology at peak output. 
If the waveguide is vacuumed and then filled with appropriate gas with a 
high dielectric strength, a field strength up to 74 MV/m can be sustained in the 
waveguide (Taylor and Giri, 1994).  
As mentioned before, in HPM applications at GW power range, the 
waveguide and the horn are evacuated. But the dimensions of the horn aperture 
must have a minimum value at which the power density and the peak electric 
field at the aperture of the antenna enable the transition from the vacuum to 1 
atm. SF6 gas. This means that the peak electric field at the aperture of the 
antenna must also be below the breakdown electric field. For the simulation, this 
value is around 3.10 MV/m. As seen on Figure 19, if the aperture has dimensions 
'a  (width of the aperture, larger dimension) and 'b  (height, smaller dimension), 
corresponding to the a and b of the waveguide, the peak electric field at the 
aperture is estimated by 
''
)()( max ba
abwaveguideEEaperturetheatE bdpeak ×==                     (4) 
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Figure 19.   Aperture details of the proposed horn antenna 










bwaveguideEEaperturetheatE bdpeak                          (5) 
Once the minimum value for 'b  is calculated, other dimension of the horn, 
'a , can be calculated as well (Taylor and Giri, 1994) (Giri, 2004). 
For example, at f = 1.2 GHz and avgP =  2GW, the peak electric field in the 
waveguide is found to be 14.3 MV/m, which means that 
'b
b  should be about 
0.2165 in order to keep the electric field below 3.10 MV/m at the aperture of the 
horn antenna. As a result, the minimum dimension of 'b  is (97.79 mm/0.2165) = 
45.17 cm. Using the same ratio for 'a , it is found to be that 'a  is (195.58 
mm/0.22) = 90.33 cm. 
The other option can be the use of parabolic dish (see Figure 20) instead 
of horn antenna. If the focal length of the parabolic dish ( F ) is known, the peak 





×= )()( max                           (6)                  
(Giri and Tesche, 2003) 
 
 
Figure 20.   Aperture details of the proposed parabolic dish antenna 
Once the electric field at the aperture of the antenna is found, the far field 
parameters may then be estimated by 
mV
r
reflectortheofareaaperturetheatEfieldfarE peakpeak /)()( ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝










⎡=                              (8) 
2/mJoulespu avg τ×=                                                                 (9) 
 40
where 
r : target distance (in meter) from the e-bomb 
)( fieldfarEpeak : E-field strength from the e-bomb at the    
    distance r  
reflectortheofarea  : '' ba×  for the horn antenna 
    
4
2dπ  for the parabolic antenna where d is the  
     diameter of the parabolic dish 
)( fieldfarpavg  : average power density 
u    : energy density (Taylor and Giri, 1994) (Giri and 
Tesche, 2003) (Giri, 2004). 
The field strength at one meter from the antenna is called the figure of 
merit (FOM). According to the far field parameters, the E-field and range product 
gives the FOM of the e-bomb. FOM provides a convenient comparative 
performance measure for HPM device outputs that is conveniently and easily 
scaled to the device peak field output at ranges beyond far-field. 
As the microwave signal propagates through the troposphere, it is 
attenuated through energy absorption by atmospheric gases and by rain. Rain 
droplets also scatter as well as absorb microwave transmissions; however, the 





Figure 21.   Atmospheric attenuation of microwave propagation at 0o C and 1 
atm due to oxygen and water absorption (Taylor and Giri, 1994). 
According to Figure 21, the attenuation due to the atmosphere is not 
significant below 1GHz. Consider the commonly used frequency at 2.45 GHz, 
where commercially available devices such as microwave ovens, cell phones etc. 
are operated. Among these devices, a microwave oven source can be used as a 
general HPM generator for an e-bomb. Any later HPM sources that will be 
defined as the source of e-bombs in this study will not be operated more than 
2.45 GHz. Since the atmospheric attenuation increases by the frequency, the 
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maximum frequency in this study (2.45 GHz) will be used as the reference 
frequency for the upper limit of atmospheric attenuation. For the microwave oven 
operating frequency (2.45 GHz), the atmospheric attenuation is around 0.0003 
dB/km. Since for the e-bomb simulation any loss in the HPM source, in the 
waveguide and at the reflector is neglected, 0.004 dB/km attenuation is chosen 
as the default atmospheric attenuation in order to fully compensate any ignored 
losses and provide a conservative output estimate. 
Attenuation (loss) due to the rain is estimated by 
kmdBxRL yR /=                                                             (10) 
where R is the rain rate in millimeters/hour. The constants x and y are dependent 
on operating frequency according to 




1 <=×= −          (12) 
GHzfGHzxx 549.242.21021.4 2
5
1 ≤≤=×= −          (13)   
and 
GHzinffyy y21=                                               (11) 
where 
GHzfyy 5.8158.0851.0 21 <==          (12) 
GHzfGHzyy 255.80779.041.1 21 ≤≤−==          (13) 
GHzfGHzyy 18025272.063.2 21 ≤≤−==     (14)                  
(Taylor and Giri, 1994)     
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Figure 22 shows the attenuation due to the rain for different rain rates at 
interested frequencies. The attenuation increases when the operating frequency 
increases. It also increases when the rain rate increases. For moderate rainfall, 
R = 5 mm/h, the corresponding path loss is 0.00038 dB/km at 1.2 GHz, 0.0008 
dB/km at 1.7 GHz, 0.0012 at 2 GHz, and 0.002 dB/km at 2.45 GHz.  
 































Figure 22.   Attenuation of microwave due to the rain at different rain rates. 
 
Up to this point, the basic theory for the hypothetical e-bomb is defined 
including the propagation features in the atmosphere. This theory as described 
will be used as the basis for MATLAB simulation calculation. 
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2. Classifications of the Source Elements 
To show a wide range of different applications, source technologies and 
the range of effects on different targets, three types of e-bomb will be categorized 
an evaluated: 
• Low-Tech (Small) E-Bomb 
• Medium-Tech (Moderate) E-Bomb 
• High-Tech (Powerful) E-Bomb 
a. Low-Tech (Small) E-Bomb 
A low-tech e-bomb is characterized by marginal performance, 
minimal technical capabilities, and is easily assembled and deployed (Giri and 
Tesche, 2003). 
For this thesis, it will be assumed that low-tech (small) e-bombs will 
be used against relatively small and unshielded systems. Unshielded systems 
are considered to be fully exposed by e-bomb electromagnetic waves. 
Low power levels are generally in the kW levels (Giri, 2004). For 
the simulation, a microwave oven specifications will be used to define the low-
tech e-bomb. There are commercially available magnetron microwaves in the 
range of 800-2000 watts, which makes for an easily procured HPM generator.  
Though militarily not applicable, the purpose of using a microwave 
oven source is to show that low-tech e-bomb designed from commercially 
available sources with average power level between 800-2000 watts are possible 
to produce field strength levels at about kV/m level at km distances with a 
reasonable antenna. 
A commercially available continuous wave (CW) microwave oven 
has the operating frequency of 2.45 GHz. From Table.1, corresponding 
rectangular waveguide can be either WR340 or WR430. For this study, both 
waveguides will be used. According to the outputs of each e-bomb (WR340 and 
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WR430), the better output of the two will be chosen for the analysis of low-tech e-
bomb. It will also set a rule to choose the appropriate waveguide in situations 
presenting more than one option.  
For radiating the low-tech e-bomb output, a parabolic (dish) 
antenna with 1.54 m2 aperture area (d=1.4m) with 0.371m focal length (F) will be 
used where d is the diameter of the dish antenna. Focal length and aperture area 
are chosen arbitrarily, but it is clear that such an antenna is available 
commercially. As mentioned before, the pulsewidth is chosen to be 100ns.  
Specifications for the  “Low-Tech (Small) E-Bomb” are shown in Table. 2. 
 
Operating frequency ( f ) 2.45 GHz 
Average power ( avgP ) 800-2000 watts 
WR340 waveguide dimensions ( ba× ) 0.086x0.043 m 
WR430 waveguide dimensions ( ba× ) 0.10922x0.05461 m 
Aperture area of the reflector ( A ) 1.54 m2  (d=1.4 m) 
Focal length of the reflector (F ) 0.371 m 
Pulsewidth (τ ) 100 ns 
Table 2.   Specifications of Low-Tech (Small) E-Bomb 
b. Medium-Tech (Moderate) E-Bomb 
The medium-tech e-bomb, as defined in this thesis, requires the 
skills of a qualified electrical engineer and relatively more sophisticated 
components such as commercial radar systems that can be modified to become 
a weapon system like e-bomb (Giri and Tesche, 2003).  
For the simulation, it will be assumed that medium-tech (moderate) 
e-bombs will be used against moderately shielded systems. A 30 dB shielding 
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effectiveness is assumed for moderately shielded systems. Civil aviation aircraft 
provide a good example for moderately shielded systems that might have roughly 
30 dB shielding. 
It is known that sufficiently intense electromagnetic signals in the 
frequency range of 200 MHZ to 5 GHz can cause electronic damage in many 
systems. For the simulation of medium-tech e-bomb, 1.2 GHz and 1.7 GHz are 
chosen as the operating frequencies due to their common applicability to 
standard radar and communications technologies that are similar in form. 
Moderate power levels can be in the range of 1 to 20 MW (Giri, 2004). For the 
average power, a range between 1-20 MW will be analyzed to decide the most 
effective power source and operating frequency. There are also commercially 
available radar systems that operate around 1.2 GHZ and 1.7 GHz frequency 
level and radiate an average power up to 20 MW.  
For the medium-tech e-bomb, corresponding rectangular 
waveguides are chosen to be WR770 for 1.2 GHz frequency and WR650 for 1.7 
GHz frequency from Table.1. After comparing the outputs of each frequency 
option of the moderate e-bomb, a conservative estimate will be identified that 
covers the largest output from the two as the medium-tech (moderate) e-bomb 
for the analysis the potentially lethal effect on different systems.  
Based on the initial work by Giri (Taylor and Giri, 1994), a parabolic 
(dish) antenna with 4.9 m2 aperture area (d=2.5m) with 0.5m focal length (F) will 
be used for reflector of the medium-tech e-bomb. Focal length and aperture area 
are chosen arbitrarily. The pulsewidth is to be 100ns (as was done for low-tech e-






Operating frequency ( f ) 1.2 GHz and 1.7 GHz 
Average power ( avgP ) 1-20 MW 
WR650 waveguide dimensions ( ba× ) 0.1651x0.08255 m 
WR770 waveguide dimensions ( ba× ) 0.19558x0.09779 m 
Aperture area of the reflector ( A ) 4.9 m2  (d=2.2 m) 
Focal length of the reflector (F ) 0.5 m 
Pulsewidth (τ ) 100 ns 
Table 3.   Specifications of Medium-Tech (Moderate) E-Bomb 
c. High-Tech (Powerful) E-Bomb 
More sophisticated high-tech and high-power electromagnetic 
systems would certainly require specialized and sophisticated technologies and 
perhaps even specifically tuned output to cause severe damage to a specific 
target (Giri, 2004). 
For the e-bomb simulation, it will be assumed that high-tech 
(powerful) e-bombs will be used against fully shielded systems. A 40-50 dB 
shielding effectiveness is assumed for fully shielded systems. Military systems 
are a good example of fully shielded systems and are procured with shielding 
requirements in order to perform designed missions. 
Following the initial work by Giri (Taylor and Giri, 1994), The 
operating frequency of high-tech (powerful) e-bomb is chosen to be 2 GHz. High 
power levels can be in the range of 100’s of MW to GW’s (Giri and Tesche, 
2003). For the average power, a 20 GW source will be used to assess the effects 
of powerful e-bomb on target systems. A 20 GW vircator source has been 
reported by Benford in 1987 (Benford, 2004). Obviously, the technology has 
 48
been improved for the past 20 years and more power is achievable with a 
reasonable, compact size. Once the lethality generated by a 20 GW source is 
assessed, one can easily think about the effects of possible lethality level 
generated by the current technology. 
For the high-tech e-bomb, corresponding rectangular waveguide is 
chosen to be WR510 from Table.1. 
A horn antenna with 12.5 m2 aperture area (5x2.5m) will be used 
for the high-tech e-bomb. The horn dimensions are chosen arbitrarily. The 
pulsewidth is to be 100ns. Specifications for the “High-Tech (Powerful) E-Bomb” 
are shown in Table. 4. 
 
Operating frequency ( f ) 2 GHz 
Average power ( avgP ) 20 GW 
WR510 waveguide dimensions ( ba× ) 0.12954x0.06477 m 
Aperture area of the horn ( A ) 12.5 m2  (5x2.5 m) 
Pulsewidth (τ ) 100 ns 
Table 4.   Specifications of High-Tech (Powerful) E-Bomb 
B. COUPLING ESTIMATES 
All electronic equipment is susceptible to malfunctions and permanent 
damage under electromagnetic illumination of sufficient intensity. The intensity 
level for system vulnerability is dependent upon the coupling from the external 
fields to the electrical circuits and their corresponding sensitivity characteristics. 
A temporary malfunction (or upset) can occur when an illuminating 
electromagnetic field induces current and voltages in the operating system 
electronic circuits at levels that are comparable to the normal operating signals. 
Permanent damage can occur when these induced stresses are at levels that 
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produce joule heating to the extent that thermal damage occurs. (usually 
between 600 and 800 degrees Kelvin) (Benford, Swegle, and Schamiloglu, 
2007). 
No matter what kind of e-bomb is used or which power/frequency/mode is 
applied, two principal coupling modes are recognized in open literature in 
assessing how much power is coupled into target systems: 
• Front Door Coupling 
• Back Door Coupling  
Both coupling mechanisms are explained here, although, only the back 
door coupling will be used in the simulation in order to assess the lethality of 
three classes of hypothetical e-bombs. Considering that front door coupling 
inherently has  more energy delivered into target systems than the energy 
delivered through back door coupling, it can be assumed that, in reality, more 
susceptibility can be achieved than the susceptibility shown in this study. 
All the coupling estimates will assume that the target system is in the main 
lobe of the e-bomb antenna. Clearly, if the target is in the sidelobes or at random 
angles, the coupling efficiency will decrease, and less power will be delivered to 
the target. 
1. Front Door Coupling 
Front Door Coupling is typically observed when the power radiated from 
the e-bomb is directly coupled into the electronic systems, which involves an 
antenna such as radars, EW or communications equipments. The antenna 
subsystem is designed to couple power in and out of the equipment, and thus 
provides an efficient path for the power flow from the electromagnetic weapon to 
enter the equipment and cause damage (Kopp, 1996).  
For front door coupling to gain entry through an antenna, it can be 
appropriate to operate the e-bomb at the in-band frequency of target system if it  
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is known (Benford, Swegle, and Schamiloglu, 2007). For this reason, most front 
door coupling is efficient for only a narrow band of frequency, and is inefficient 
outside the band. 
2. Back Door Coupling 
Back Door Coupling occurs when the electromagnetic field from the e-
bomb produces large transient currents (termed spikes, when produced by a 
transient source) or electrical standing waves (when produced by a HPM 
weapon) thru cracks, small apertures and on fixed electrical wiring and cables 
interconnecting equipment, or providing connections to power mains or the 
telephone network. Equipment connected to exposed cables or wiring will 
experience either high voltage transient spikes or standing waves, which can 
damage power supplies and communications interfaces if not shielded or 
inherently robust. Moreover, should the transient penetrate into the equipment, 
other devices inside can be damaged through mutual coupling. Any cable can 
comprise multiple linear segments, which are typically at close to right angles; 
therefore, whatever the relative orientation of the e-bomb, one or more segments 
can provide very good coupling efficiency. Network cables use fast, low-loss 
dielectrics and are thus very efficient at propagating such transients with minimal 
loss (Kopp, 1996). Back door coupling can generally be described as wideband, 
but may have narrow-band characteristics because of resonance effects 
(coupling to cables for example). 
Theory for the back door coupling is more complex than that for the front 
door coupling. Since the cross section of coupling is difficult to determine for the 
target system, the susceptibility results can be different from the expected 
(Benford, Swegle, and Schamiloglu, 2007). 
For the validation of the hypothetical e-bomb model and the assessment 
of each e-bomb’s lethality, a basic theory relating field strength to coupled current 
will be used in the simulation.  
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The point form of Ohm’s Law indicates that the conduction current density 
generated on a wire or a coaxial cable depends on the conductivity of that 
material and the electric field strength that the wire/coaxial cable is subjected to. 
Current density in Ampere/square meter is given by 
EJ σ=    A/m2                                                        (15) 
where 
 σ   : Conductivity of material (target system design) 
 E   : E-field strength that the wire/coaxial cable is  
     subjected to (Ulaby, 2006). 
The conductivity of the materials used in the simulation is shown in 
Table.5. 
Material Conductivity, σ   Siemens/meter (S/m)
Silver 6.2 x 107 
Copper 5.8 x 107 
Gold 4.1 x 107 
Aluminum 3.5 x 107 
Iron 107 
Table 5.   Conductivity of materials used in the simulation (Ulaby, 2006) 
Once the current density is determined, for an arbitrary surface S, the total 
current flowing through that surface is given by 
∫= S AAmperedsJI )(.                                           (16) 







wdJI π                                                           (17) 
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where 
 J   : Current density 
 wd   : Diameter of the wire (Ulaby, 2006). 
For coaxial cables, equation (16), the surface integration, becomes 
( )lrJI cπ2=                                                           (18) 
where 
 J   : Current density 
 cr   : Radial distance of coaxial cable from the axis  
     of the center conductor 
 l   : Length of coaxial cable (Ulaby, 2006). 
Once the total current flowing through the wire/cable is determined, the 
coupled power can be expressed by  
mc RIP
2=                                                           (19) 
where 
 cP   : coupled power 
 mR   : matched load of the target system. 
Using the field-current relationships, the coupled power into the target 
system is compared with known electromagnetic susceptibility limits of electronic 
circuits and components in order to determine the potential susceptibility of each 
e-bomb against different targets. 
C. EFFECTS ON TARGETS 
E-bomb interactions with system electronics can be categorized in four 
levels of destructive effect (upset, lock-up, latch-up, and burnout) and are 
dependent upon: 
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• Distance to the target 
• Vulnerability of the target 
• Operating frequency 
• Coupled power level and power density on the target 
• Bandwidth 
• Burst rate and pulse duration  
• Dwell time on the target 
• Coupling mode or entry points 
These four potential effects of e-bombs on targets can be categorized into 
a hierarchy of lethality (described in the following paragraphs), each of which 
require increasing microwave emission on the target. 
1. Soft-Kill 
A soft kill is produced when the effects of the weapon cause the operation 
of the target equipment or system to be temporarily disrupted. A good example is 
a computer system, which is caused to reset or transition into an unrecoverable 
or hung state. The result is a temporary loss of function, which can seriously 
compromise the operation of any system that is critically dependent upon the 
computer system in question (Kopp, 1996). 
Soft kill can occur in two forms: 
a.  Upset 
Upset is a temporary alteration of the electrical state of one or more 
nodes, in which the nodes no longer function normally. Upset means particular 
interaction as observed between a weapon and the operating state of the target 
system at the time, as the state changes, upsets could subside. Given operating 
state, the upset continues until the impressed radiation is terminated. Once the 
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signal is removed, the affected system can be easily restored to its previous 
condition. Interference caused by jamming equipment or lightning are examples 
of this type of deny effect (Deveci, 2007). 
b. Lock-up 
Lock-up is similar to upset in that the electrical states of affected 
nodes are temporarily altered, but the functionality of these nodes remains 
altered after the radiation is removed. Lock-up produces a temporary alteration 
similar to upset, but electrical reset or shut off and restart is necessary to regain 
functionality after the radiation is removed. Degrading is an example that requires 
the intervention by an external operator or special safeguard procedures to 
reload the target system (Deveci, 2007). 
2. Hard-Kill 
A hard kill is produced when the effects of the weapon cause permanent 
electrical damage to the target equipment or system, necessitating either the 
repair or the replacement of the equipment or system in question. An example is 
a computer system that experiences damage to its power supply, peripheral 
interfaces and memory. The equipment may or may not be repairable, subject to 
the severity of the damage, and this can, in turn, render inoperable — for 
extended periods of time — any system that is critically dependent upon this 
computer system (Kopp, 1996). 
Hard kill can be seen in two forms: 
a.  Latch-up 
Latch-up is an extreme form of lockup in which parasitic elements 
are excited and conduct current in relatively large amounts until either the node is 
permanently self-destroyed or the electrical power is switched off to the node. 
This effect can run down batteries supplying power to the affected nodes or can  
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pull down power supply voltages. No responding semiconductor devices to an 
input or transistors failing on a circuit board due to overloads from radiation are 
two latch-up examples (Deveci, 2007). 
b.  Damage/Burnout 
Damage/burnout is electrical destruction of a node by some 
mechanism like latch-up, metallization burnout, or junction burnout. Because 
electrical overstress can cause charge buildups in passivation layers and  
dielectric layers that decay with the time, damage is often distinguished as to its 
degree of performance. One will often find the term “permanent damage” or 
“electrical burnout” used to describe the more catastrophic kinds of damage. 
Damage/burnout occurs when the high-power microwave energy causes melting 
in capacitors, resistors or conductors. Burnout mostly occurs in the junction 
region where multiple wires or the base collector or emitter of a transistor come 
together, and often involves electrical arcing. Consequently, the heating is 
localized to the junction region. A lightning strike’s effect on electronic devices is 
a burnout example (Deveci, 2007). 
D. MODEL 
It is far too complicated to ideally and faithfully represent the effects of 
proposed e-bombs through back-of-envelop calculation methods since it involves 
a wide range of interacting and interdependent parameters and equations. 
However, reliable and dependable predictions for coupling to a wide variety of 
electric circuitry environments and components are still needed and valuable 
when used to assess the potential effects of e-bombs. For this reason, a 
MATLAB simulation is used to simulate each type of described e-bomb. The flow 
diagram of this simulation is shown on Figure 23. The output designated by the 
numbers is the output plots of the simulation and defined in the next paragraph. 
The MATLAB code for the simulation is shown in Appendix-B. The 
model’s output is: 
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• The maximum E-field that can propagate in the air without 
breakdown 
• Minimum dimensions of the horn antenna in order to avoid the 
breakdown in the air 
• “E-field strength vs. the distance” plot of e-bomb (without loss) (1) 
• “E-field strength vs. the distance” plot of e-bomb with atmospheric 
loss (2) 
 
Figure 23.   Flow Diagram of MATLAB Simulation 
• “E-field strength vs. the distance” plot of e-bomb with atmospheric 
loss + loss due to rain (3) 
• “Average power density vs. the distance” plot of e-bomb with 
atmospheric loss (4) 
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• “Average power density vs. the distance” plot of e-bomb with 
atmospheric loss + loss due to rain (5) 
• “Energy density vs. the distance” plot of e-bomb with atmospheric 
loss (6) 
• “Energy density vs. the distance” plot of e-bomb with atmospheric 
loss + loss due to rain (7) 
• “Flowing current vs. the distance” plot of e-bomb with atmospheric 
loss (for chosen material) (8) 
• “Flowing current vs. the distance” plot of e-bomb with atmospheric 
loss + loss due to rain (for chosen material) (9) 
• “Flowing current vs. the distance for shielded systems” plot of e-
bomb with atmospheric loss (for chosen material) (10) 
• “Flowing current vs. the distance for shielded systems” plot of e-
bomb with atmospheric loss + loss due to rain (for chosen material) 
(11) 
• “Delivered power vs. the distance for unshielded” plot of e-bomb for 
atmospheric loss and rain loss (for chosen material and chosen 
matched load) (12) 
• “Delivered power vs. the distance for shielded systems” plot of e-
bomb with atmospheric loss (for chosen material and chosen 
matched load) (13) 
• “Delivered power vs. the distance for shielded systems” plot of e-
bomb with atmospheric loss + loss due to rain (for chosen material 
and chosen matched load) (14) 
According to the results obtained from the simulation, a susceptibility 
assessment is performed and critically analyzed. Finally, an assessment of 
military utility is conducted. 
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E. VALIDATION OF THE MODEL 
Consider a scenario that includes a medium-tech (moderate) e-bomb used 
against a commercial airplane. The e-bomb in this scenario will be radiating 
microwave energy 500 feet away from the airplane. The inherent question is, 
“Can medium-tech e-bombs generate a field strength or deliver a force into the 
airplane electronic systems, such as radars, communication devices, electronic 
modules etc., that cause damage to important electronic devices?” 
The answer to this question leads to the need to validate the proposed 
simulation in this thesis. A validated model adds credibility to the results obtained 
in terms of expected “real world” coupling effects. Such a validation scenario is 
shown in Figure 24.  
For this scenario, a medium-tech (moderate) e-bomb is used in the 
system interaction estimations. As mentioned before, the interested target for 
moderate e-bomb is civil aviation. It is assumed that the electrical systems on the 
airplane involve coupling to a representative cable that is 100 ohms impedance 
matched to a load circuit. The specifications for the moderate e-bomb is shown in 
Table 6. All specifications are chosen to be arbitrary, but, at the same time, 




Figure 24.   Scenario for validation of e-bomb simulation 
 
 
Operating frequency ( f ) 1.2 GHz 
Average power ( avgP ) 700 kW 
WR770 waveguide dimensions ( ba× ) 0.19558x0.09779 m 
Aperture area of the reflector  ( A ) 3.14 m2  (d=2 m) 
Focal length of the reflector (F ) 0.5 m 
Pulsewidth (τ ) 100 ns 
Table 6.   Moderate E-Bomb specifications for validating scenario 
 
As a first step and upon completing a simulation run, the results of the 
simulation are compared to the (High Intensity Radiated Field) HIRF Environment 
Standards for commercial aircrafts.  
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The HIRF environment standards guide is a document that provides 
technical guidance to demonstrate compliance with best-practice aircraft high 
intensity radiated field certification regulations. The HIRF regulations are 
applicable to any civilian aircraft. The more specific area of applicability to each 
aircraft is the continued availability of functions related to safe takeoff, flight, and 
landing during and after exposure to HIRF. It must be demonstrated and certified 
that aircraft systems that perform functions related to safe takeoff, flight, and 
landing must not be lost when the aircraft is exposed to the Severe or 
Certification HIRF Environment (HIRF Standards, 2003).   
The environments were defined from considering all deployed emitters 
operating at peak output located in the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska 
and Puerto Rico, plus the five participating European countries: United Kingdom, 
Germany, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands (HIRF Standards, 2003). 
The external environment is found to exist due to the radiation of Radio 
Frequency (RF) electromagnetic energy into free space. This energy is radiated 
from radio, television, radar emitters, and from other sources. Figure 25 depicts 
many of these common electromagnetic sources that couple to and cause 
interference with electrical wiring of aircraft. Two of these sources of great 
concern to the aircraft designers and manufacturers are the high-energy external 
RF emissions from radars and radio transmitters and the effects of direct and 
indirect lightning. Contributing to the electromagnetic environment are more than 
500,000 emitters in the U.S. and Western Europe. The HIRF environments are a 
composite of transmitters that are airborne, land-based, offshore platforms, and 
ship-based. These transmitters are becoming more sophisticated, more efficient, 
more powerful, and more numerous. The emitters cover the entire Radio 
Frequency (RF) spectrum and their radiated fields vary greatly in energy levels 
and signal characteristics.  
The Severe HIRF Environment is based on the “worst case” estimate of 
electromagnetic field strengths that a civil aircraft might encounter.  
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The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) flight standards allow 
flight to within 500 feet of the ground under visual flight rules (VFR) for fixed wing 
aircraft. Although this is uncommon for many aircrafts, it is permissible. At such 
an altitude, aircraft have the potential to come extremely close to terrestrial-
based emitters that produce RF field levels at the aircraft in excess of 7,000 
volts/meter. This resulted in the committee establishing two Severe HIRF 
environments, one for fixed wing aircraft and one for rotorcraft. The material in 
HIRF standards deals only with flights above 500 feet except during landing and 




































Figure 25.   HIRF Environment for an aircraft 
The Fixed Wing Severe HIRF Environment is defined as “the worst case 
estimate of the electromagnetic field strength levels in which the airspace in 
which fixed wing flight operations are permitted” (HIRF Standards, 2003). 
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For the simulation in this study, Fixed Wing Severe HIRF Environment is 
used to compare the output of the study. These composite levels are shown as a 
function of frequency in Table 7. 
 
FIELD STRENGTH (V/m) FREQUENCY 
PEAK AVERAGE 
10 kHz – 100 kHz 50 50 
100 kHz – 500 kHz 60 60 
500 kHz – 2 MHz 70 70 
2 MHz – 30 MHz 200 200 
30 MHz – 70 MHz 30 30 
70 MHz – 100 MHz 30 30 
100 MHz – 200 MHz 90 30 
200 MHz – 400 MHz 70 70 
400 MHz – 700 MHz 730 80 
700 MHz – 1 GHz 1400 240 
1 GHz – 2 GHz 3300 160 
2 GHz – 4 GHz 4500 490 
4 GHz – 6 GHz 7200 300 
6 GHz – 8 GHz 1100 170 
8 GHz – 12 GHz 2600 330 
12 GHz – 18 GHz 2000 330 
18 GHz – 40 GHz 1000 420 
Table 7.   Fixed Wing Severe HIRF Environment (HIRF Standards, 2003) 
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The second step to validate the model is to show whether the generated 
E-field is sufficient to couple enough power into the target system. For this 
reason, estimated coupled power into the target is compared to published 
damage threshold levels for devices such as representative transistors, SCRs, 
diodes, and integrated circuits. A valuable damage threshold level report was 
published by Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) in 1977. DNA defined the damage 
threshold levels in kilowatts of the power. A damage threshold power range 
derived from experimental evidence and representative devices is demonstrated 
by the horizontal bars in Figure 26. According to the data shown in the figure, a 
damage threshold power may be as low as 1 watt for microwave diodes or as 
high as 40 kW for high power transistors.  
 
 
Figure 26.   Damage threshold power range of representative transistors, 
SCRs, diodes, and integrated circuits (Mendel, 1997) 
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The airplane in the chosen scenario is assumed to have a 30 dB shielding 
(moderate). The 30 dB shielding also corresponds to the level of shielding that is 
necessary for the avionics in civil aircraft and helicopters in order to withstand the 
radar frequency HIRF environment (Bäckström, and Lövstrand, 2004). 
For the medium source representation of an e-bomb specified in Table 6, 
a field strength at 267.9 kV/m is created in the waveguide. Since it is less than 
the breakdown field strength, 3.1 MV/m, no vacuum is required for the 
waveguide. The generated E-field at the aperture of the antenna from this 
waveguide field is then about 41 kV/m, which is also less than the breakdown 
level. The corresponding FOM is 514 kV/m. (recall that FOM is the far-field 
output of the device as it would be measured one-meter from the source antenna 
and in the direction of maximum field output). 
Using the FOM, estimates at far-field electromagnetic environments 
produced by the source can be easily generated as a function of range (Field 
strength = FOM/range). The E-field strength of moderate e-bomb with 
atmospheric losses vs. the range is shown in Figure 27. According to this figure, 
the hypothetical moderate e-bomb produces an E-field strength of 3.36 kV/m at 
153 meters (500 feet is converted to 152.5 meters and approximated to 153 
meters). Notice that this environment almost identically matches the HIRF 
threshold at 1 GHz for reliable equipment operations. The 3 kV/m result is 
therefore tagged as important and significant.  
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E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 27.   E-field strength of moderate e-bomb 
If it is assumed that the civil airplane considered in the validation model 
has electrical equipment configuration that involve a 2 mm-diameter-copper wire 
(common), the coupled electric field delivers 613 A current into a matched, fully 
exposed, unshielded electronic system (see Figure 28). 































Flowing current delivered into unshielded target system
 
Figure 28.   Current vs. the range plot of moderate e-bomb for unshielded 
systems 
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When the 30 dB shielding is applied to the simulation, corresponding 
current coupled into the system decreases to 19 A (see Figure 29). 




































Figure 29.   Current vs. the range plot of moderate e-bomb for shielded systems 
Corresponding power coupled into the 30 dB-shielded target system is 
37.6 kW for a 100 ohms-matched load circuit (see Figure 30) 
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Delivered power into 30 dB shielded target system
 
Figure 30.   Delivered power into 30 dB shielded systems vs. the distance 
 
Figure 31.   Delivered power into the 30 dB-shielded system 
 
 68
The power produced by the moderate e-bomb in 30 dB-shielded system 
falls on the upper side of the range for damage threshold levels of representative 
devices (see Figure 31). That means, the medium technology e-bomb in the 
scenario produces outputs on electronic equipments of a commercial airplane, 
which is 500 feet away from the e-bomb, that most likely exceed all known 
electromagnetic device damage susceptibility limits. The results show that the 
field strength produced by hypothetical moderate e-bomb is also consistent with 
the field data given by HIRF standards. (3.364 kV/m vs. 3.3 kV/m).  
As a result, the scenario explained in this section validates the model 
developed to represent the hypothetical e-bomb. Model results are consistent 
with the HIRF environment thresholds and have exceeded all device damage 
limits. It is therefore a realistic expected exposure level and, because of the 
delivered power expected, it produces an important result. The validated model is 
used to assess the potential lethality effect of each type of e-bomb. HIRF 
standards in field strength have been tied to damage thresholds, so they are 
used as the reference to assess the potential lethality of e-bomb on commercial 
airplanes. Potential lethality is described because actual coupling levels in real 
(not modeled) systems will depend on many additional factors.  This fact does 
not guarantee lethality, but does provide a condition of potential lethality based 
on our understanding of the system, the model used, and the database of 
damage criteria available. 
F. POTENTIAL LETHALITY OF HYPOTHETICAL E-BOMB 
The potential lethality of each type of e-bomb of interest depends on the 
target attacked. Targets are classified as:  
• Unshielded Systems 
• Moderately Shielded Systems 
• Fully Shielded Systems 
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Unshielded systems are fully exposed by electric fields produced by 
radiating sources and will be considered in the interest of the low-tech (small) e-
bomb. Moderately shielded systems are the systems that have 30 dB shielding. 
Civil aviation is in the interest of the medium-tech (moderate) e-bomb. In 
addition, civil aviation can be considered as moderately shielded systems 
according to the data, which is consistent with HIRF standards. Fully shielded 
systems are the systems that have 40-50 dB shielding effectiveness (SE). 
Military systems can be considered in this group and is in the interest of the high-
tech (powerful) e-bomb. 
The potential lethality ranges is estimated by using the known/published 
susceptibility levels from DNA reports as described earlier. 
1. Low-Tech (Small) E-Bomb 
The specifications for a low-tech e-bomb, as used in the simulation, are 
defined in Table 1. The low-tech simulation is run for each power level of the e-
bomb. In the first step, it is assumed that the e-bomb is designed by using 
WR340 (a=0.086 m, b=0.043 m) waveguide. The output of the e-bomb is shown 









800 21.55 1.75 22.06 
900 22.86 1.86 23.04 
1000 24.10 1.96 24.67 
1100 25.27 2.06 25.87 
1200 26.40 2.15 27.02 
1300 27.47 2.24 28.12 
1400 28.51 2.32 29.18 
1500 29.51 2.40 30.21 
1600 30.48 2.48 31.20 
1700 31.41 2.56 32.16 
1800 32.32 2.63 33.09 
1900 33.21 2.70 34.00 
2000 34.07 2.77 34.88 
Table 8.   Simulation output for field strengths of low-tech e-bomb with 
WR340 waveguide 
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If the e-bomb is designed by using WR430 (a=0.10922 m, b=0.05461 m) 
waveguide, the strength of the E-field produced by the low-tech e-bomb slightly 
increases. It also decreases the field strength in the waveguide. This must be 
noted in order to use as a rule of thumb for high-level powers. Output of the 










800 15.6 2.05 25.8 
900 16.5 2.17 27.3 
1000 17.4 2.29 28.8 
1100 18.3 2.40 30.2 
1200 19.1 2.51 31.6 
1300 19.9 2.61 32.9 
1400 20.6 2.71 34.1 
1500 21.4 2.81 35.3 
1600 22.1 2.90 36.5 
1700 22.7 2.99 37.6 
1800 23.4 3.07 38.7 
1900 24.1 3.16 39.77 
2000 24.7 3.24 40.8 
Table 9.   Simulation output for field strengths of low-tech e-bomb with 
WR430 waveguide 
Given that the e-bomb includes WR430 waveguide and has two power 
levels, 1500 watts and 2000 watts, the produced field strength at a range 1 km 
from the e-bomb is 35.3 V/m for 1500 watts and 40.8 V/m for 2000 watts (see 
Table 9). These estimates do not include the atmospheric losses. 
 
Pavg (watts) E 
r = 1m 
E 
 r = 500 m 
E 
r = 1 km 
1500 35.3 kV/m 70.6 V/m 35.3 V/m 
2000 40.8 kV/m 81.6 V/m 40.8 V/m 
Table 10.   Evaluation Field strengths of low-tech e-bomb at different ranges 
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Among the different power levels, a 2000-watts source is chosen with 
WR430 waveguide in order to estimate the potential lethality range for different 
types of targets. 
Some of the simulation outputs for different parameters of the e-bomb are 
shown on Figure 32 (All simulation output for the low-tech e-bomb is shown in 
Appendix-C). The results show that for the ranges less than 1500 meters, the 
atmospheric loss due to the moderate rain is insignificant. Assuming a lossless 
propagation environment, the E-field strength at 1 km from the e-bomb is 40.8 
V/m where E-field strength with atmospheric loss is 40.78 V/m and E-field 


































E-field strength of E-bomb (lossless)




















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss




















E-field strength of E-bomb in the rain






















Average power density of E-bomb






















Energy density of E-bomb
 
Figure 32.   Simulation output for low-tech e-bomb 
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Upset levels as low as 15 V/m have been reported for the electronic 
control module in a public bus engine (Bäckström and Lövstrand, 2004). 
According to the referenced report, 15 V/m field strength caused an engine to 
stop. If considered as a threshold value for public bus engines, according to the 
simulation, the low-tech e-bomb model produces field strength that exceed the 
electromagnetic susceptibility limits of the cited public bus for ranges up to 2.7 
km (see Figure 33). That means, the proposed low-tech e-bomb has a potential 
upset effect out to a range of 2716 meters as compared to the public bus data. 






















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 33.   Low-tech E-bomb lethality range for public bus threshold level 
Another upset threshold level al low as 30 V/m was reported for personal 
computers (PC) when 30 V/m field strength caused disruption and as a result 
computer had to be rebooted in order to gain operation (Bäckström and 
Lövstrand, 2004). If this level is considered as the upset threshold value for 
similar electronic to PCs, according to the simulation, the low-tech e-bomb 
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produces field strength that exceeds the electromagnetic susceptibility limits of 
PC up to 1.36 km away from the antenna (see Figure 34). That means, the 
proposed low-tech e-bomb has a potential upset effect range of 1359 meters 
against personal computers, or similar electronics. One can think that the new 
PCs are even more susceptible to microwave radiation than older ones. In this 
case, it is clear that the lethality range of e-bomb is even greater than 1.36 km 
against PCs. 






















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 34.   Low-tech E-bomb lethality range for personal computer 
In the same article, permanent damage level for exposure to fields as low 
as 100 V/m is reported for PC flat screens (Bäckström, and Lövstrand, 2004). In 
this case, the low-tech e-bomb model produces field strengths that exceeds the 
electromagnetic susceptibility limits of PC flat screens threshold up to 400 meters 
(see Figure 35). That means, the proposed low-tech e-bomb has a potential 
lethality range of 407 meters against personal computer flat screens. 
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E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 35.   Low-tech E-bomb lethality range for personal computer flat screen 
Finally, for the KIM-1 microprocessor, upset level as low as 2 V/m were 
reported (Taylor and Giri, 1994). For any electronic devices that involve KIM-1 
microprocessor, the low-tech e-bomb model produces field strength that exceeds 
the electromagnetic susceptibility limits of KIM-1 microprocessor for all ranges up 
to 20 km (see Figure 36). That is, the proposed low-tech e-bomb has an upset 
threshold range of 20 km against the fully exposed electronic devices that 
involves KIM-1 microprocessors. 
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E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 36.   Low-tech E-bomb lethality range for KIM-1 microprocessor 
2. Medium-Tech (Moderate) E-Bomb 
The specifications for medium-tech (moderate) e-bomb are defined in 
Table 1. The medium tech simulation is run for two operating mode of e-bomb. 
The first mode has the operating frequency of 1.2 GHz and corresponding 
waveguide is WR770 (a=0.19558 m, b=0.09779 m). Table 11 shows the different 











1 0.32 48.9 0.96 
2 0.45 69.3 1.35 
3 0.55 84.8 1.66 
4 0.64 97.9 1.92 
5 0.71 109.5 2.14 
6 0.78 120.0 2.35 
7 0.84 129.6 2.54 
8 0.90 138.5 2.71 
9 0.96 146.9 2.88 
10 1.01 154.9 3.03 
11 1.06 162.4 3.18 
12 1.11 169.7 3.32 
13 1.15 176.6 3.46 
14 1.19 183.3 3.59 
15 1.24 189.7 3.72 
16 1.28 195.9 3.84 
17 1.32 202.0 3.95 
18 1.36 207.8 4.07 
19 1.39 213.5 4.18 
20 1.43 219.1 4.29 
Table 11.   Simulation output for field strengths of medium-tech e-bomb with 
WR770 waveguide 
 
Proposed e-bomb produces 3.72 kV/m field strength at 1 km for 15 MW 
power level and 4.29 kV/m for 20 MW at the same point (see Table 12). 
Calculations do not include atmospheric losses. 
 
 
Pavg (MW) E 
r = 1m 
E 
 r = 1 km 
E 
r = 5 km 
E 
r = 10 km 
E 
r = 100 km
15 3.72 MV/m 3.72 kV/m 744 V/m 372 V/m 37.2 V/m 
20 4.29 MV/m 4.29 kV/m 858 V/m 429 V/m 42.9 V/m 
Table 12.   Field strengths of low-tech e-bomb at different ranges 
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The second mode has the operating frequency of 1.7 GHz and 
corresponding waveguide is WR650 (a=0.1651 m, b=0.08255 m). With the 
increased frequency and relatively smaller waveguide the strength of E-field 










15 1.40 216.4 6.01 
20 1.61 249.9 6.94 
Table 13.   Simulation output for field strengths of low-tech e-bomb with 
WR430 waveguide 
Given that the e-bomb operating frequency is 1.7 GHz and is configured 
for two power levels, 15 MW and 20 MW, the produced field strength at 1 km 
from the e-bomb is 6.01 kV/m for 15 MW and 6.94 kV/m for 20 MW (see Table 





r = 1m 
E 
 r = 1 km 
E 
r = 5 km 
E 
r = 10 km 
E 
r = 100 km 
15 6.01 MV/m 6.01 kV/m 1.202 kV/m 601 V/m 60.1 V/m 
20 6.94 MV/m 6.94 kV/m 1.388 kV/m 694 V/m 69.4 V/m 
Table 14.   Field strengths of low-tech e-bomb at different ranges 
Among the different power levels, 20 MW source is chosen with WR650 
waveguide in order to estimate the potential lethality range of the moderate e-
bomb simulation for different types of targets. 
Some of the simulation output for different parameters of the e-bomb is 
shown on Figure 37 (All simulation output for the medium-tech e-bomb is shown 
in Appendix-C). The results show that at 4 km, the atmospheric loss due to the 
moderate rain decreases the field strength by 1 V/m.  Lossless E-field strength at 
4 km from the e-bomb is 1.735 kV/m where E-field strength with atmospheric loss 
is 1.732 kV/m and E-field strength with atmospheric loss and rain loss is 1.731 

























Figure 37.   Simulation output for medium-tech e-bomb 


















E-field strength of E-bomb (lossless)


















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss


















E-field strength of E-bomb in the rain

























Average power density of E-bomb
 
























Energy density of E-bomb
 
 80
In evaluating the outputs from the medium-tech e-bomb model, it will be 
appropriate to compare the radiated field strengths to the “design-to” standards 
for commercial aircraft (i.e., HIRF standards). As mentioned before, 30 dB 
shielding models commercial aircraft shielding effectiveness. 
The HIRF standards shows that at the frequency range between 1-2 GHz, 
the maximum electric field strength environment in which the commercial 
airplanes fly is 3.3 kV/m (HIRF Standards, 2003). According to the simulation 
results, it can be concluded that the medium-tech e-bomb produces field strength 
that exceeds the HIRF standard limits of commercial airplanes up to a range from 
source of 2.1 km (see Figure 38). That is, the proposed medium-tech e-bomb 
has a potential lethality range of 2100 meters against commercial airplanes. 
 




















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 38.   Medium-tech E-bomb lethality range for commercial airplanes 
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In the DNA report (DNA EMP Awareness Course Notes, Mindel, I. N. DNA 
Report No DNA2772T), it can be concluded that all known representative 
transistors, silicon-controlled rectifiers, diodes, and integrated circuits are 
susceptible to be damaged by 30 kW power level (Mendel, 1997). If this level is 
considered as a threshold value for any electronic system that includes one or 
more of those devices; according to the simulation, the medium-tech e-bomb 
delivers power into moderately shielded (30 dB) systems enough to exceed the 
electromagnetic susceptibility limits of those systems up to 2.3 km (see Figure 
39). That is, the proposed medium-tech e-bomb has a potential lethality range of 
2306 meters against moderately shielded systems.  
 

























Figure 39.   Medium-tech e-bomb potential lethality range for moderately 
shielded electronic systems 
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If the system is a 40 dB-shielded (fully shielded) military system, in this 
case, simulation results show that the medium-tech e-bomb produces power that 
exceeds the electromagnetic susceptibility limits of representative devices up to 
730 meters (see Figure 40). That is, the proposed medium-tech e-bomb has a 
potential lethality range of 730 meters against 40 dB-shielded military systems. 
 
























Figure 40.   Medium-tech e-bomb potential lethality range for military systems     
(40 dB SE) 
If the military system is shielded by 50 dB, the potential lethality range for 
permanent damage of the system then reduces to 231 m (see Figure 41).  
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Figure 41.   Medium-tech e-bomb potential lethality range for military systems     
(50 dB SE) 
Recently, test results of HPM effects on Swedish Fighter Aircraft were 
published in open literature (Bäckström and Lövstrand, 2004). The test was 
conducted at microwave test facility (MTF) designed by the U.S. company TITAN 
Beta. Currently, the test facility is operated by Aerotech Telub for the systems 
owned by Swedish Defense Material Administration.  
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Figure 42.   The Swedish MTF testing the HPM effects on Swedish Fighter 
Aircraft (Bäckström and Lövstrand, 2004) 
The described test investigated susceptibility of the military systems to 
HPM.  The results showed that upset began to occur around a few hundred volts 
per meter. On the other hand, the threshold level for permanent damage was 
reported at the field strength of 15-25 kV/m. 
If the upset level for military systems is assumed 750 V/m according to the 
empirical data reported by Bäckström, and Lövstrand, it can be concluded that 
the potential upset range of proposed medium-tech e-bomb model against the 
military aircrafts is about 9.2 km (see Figure 43).  
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E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 43.   Medium-tech e-bomb potential upset range for Swedish Fighter 
Aircraft 
From the empirical data in the Swedish fighter testing, 15 kV/m field 
strength was assumed as the threshold value of military aircrafts for permanent 
damage. Under this assumption, the output of the simulation shows that the 
medium-tech e-bomb model produces field strength that exceeds the 
electromagnetic susceptibility limits of Swedish Fighter Aircraft for ranges up to 
463 m (see Figure 44).  
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E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 44.   Medium-tech e-bomb potential lethality range for Swedish Fighter 
Aircraft 
The comparison of simulation results of military systems for the stated 
assumptions and the empirical data are shown in Table 15. The output data 
shows that 40-50 dB shielding effectiveness assumption for military systems is 




range for Permanent 









range for Permanent 
damage against 50 dB 
shielded military 
systems 
730 m. 463 m. 231 m. 
Table 15.   Potential Lethality range comparison of military systems for 
moderate e-bomb 
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It has also been reported that the unshielded computers suffer bit errors 
when exposed to microwave fluence as low as 10-8 μJ/cm2 ( = 10-10 J/m2) through 
the back-door coupling (Florig, 1988). This threshold value can be compared to 
the energy density of the e-bomb model in the simulation. The simulation output 
shows that the medium-tech e-bomb produces energy density that exceeds the 
electromagnetic susceptibility limits of unshielded computers up to 8 km (see 
Figure 45). That is, the proposed medium-tech e-bomb has the potential upset 
range of 7963 m against the unshielded computer in terms of causing bit errors. 
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3. High-Tech (Powerful) E-Bomb 
The specifications for high-tech (powerful) e-bomb are defined in Table 1. 
The proposed e-bomb now has 2 GHz operating frequency and corresponding 











20 66.4 1.72 143.35 
Table 16.   Simulation output for field strengths of high-tech e-bomb 
The results show that the produced field strength is 143.35 kV/m at 1 km 
from the e-bomb and 14.4 kV/m at 10 km (see Table 17). These estimates do not 





r = 1m 
E 
 r = 1 km 
E 
r = 5 km 
E 
r = 10 km 
E 
r = 100 km 
20 143.35 MV/m 143.35 kV/m 28.67 kV/m 14.335 kV/m 1.44 kV/m 
Table 17.   Field strengths of high-tech e-bomb at different ranges 
Some of the simulation output for different parameters of the e-bomb is 
shown in Figure 46 (All simulation output for the high-tech e-bomb is shown in 
Appendix-C). The results show that at 9 km, the atmospheric loss due to the 
moderate rain decreases the field strength by 20 V/m.  Lossless E-field strength 
at 9 km from the e-bomb is then 15.93 kV/m where E-field strength with 
atmospheric loss is 15.86 kV/m and E-field strength with atmospheric loss and 

























Figure 46.   Simulation output for high-tech e-bomb 
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According to the HIRF standards, simulation results show that the high-
tech e-bomb produces field strength that exceeds the standard environment 
limits of commercial airplanes up to 42.6 km (see Figure 47). That is, the 
proposed high-tech e-bomb has a potential lethality range of 42,590 meters 
against commercial airplanes. 


















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 47.   High-tech e-bomb potential lethality range for commercial airplanes 
Simulation outputs shows that moderately shielded electronic systems are 
susceptible to the high-tech e-bomb up to 46.7 km (see Figure 48). That is, the 
proposed high-tech e-bomb has a potential lethality range of 46.67 km against 
moderately shielded systems. 
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Figure 48.   High-tech e-bomb potential lethality range for moderately shielded 
electronic systems (30 dB SE) 
If the electronic equipment is a 40 dB-shielded (fully shielded) military 
system, in this case, simulation results show that the high-tech e-bomb produces 
power that exceeds the electromagnetic susceptibility limits of representative 
devices up to 15 km (see Figure 49). That is, the proposed high-tech e-bomb has 
a potential lethality range of 14.98 meters against 40 dB-shielded military 
systems. 
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Figure 49.   High-tech e-bomb potential lethality range for military systems          
(40 dB SE) 
If the military system has 50 dB in shielding, the potential lethality range 
for permanent damage of the system then drops to 6.72 km (see Figure 50). 

























Figure 50.   High-tech e-bomb potential lethality range for military systems          
(50 dB SE) 
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The high-tech e-bomb produces more than 15 kV/m field strength, which 
was the permanent damage threshold level for Swedish Fighter Aircraft, up to 9.5 
km (see Figure 51), which means that the potential lethality range for e-bomb is 
9,500 m. 
















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
Figure 51.   High-tech e-bomb potential lethality range for Swedish Fighter 
Aircraft 
The comparisons of simulation results of military systems for the 
assumption data and the empirical data are shown in Table 18. The data again 
verifies the 40-50 dB shielding effectiveness is appropriate for military systems. 
 
Potential Lethality 
range for Permanent 









range for Permanent 
damage against 50 dB 
shielded military 
systems 
14980 m. 9512 m. 6724 m. 
Table 18.   Lethality range comparison of military systems for powerful e-bomb 
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Finally, according to the reported data, the simulation shows that the 
proposed high-tech e-bomb has a potential upset range of 153.8 km against the 
unshielded computer in terms of causing bit errors (see Figure 52). 































Energy density of E-bomb
 
Figure 52.   High-tech e-bomb potential upset range for unshielded computers 
G. DEFENSE AGAINST E-BOMB 
The possible effect of an e-bomb could be upset or permanently damage 
on electronic devices within the lethality range. Even though the electronic device 
is turned off, there is still a high possibility that the device could be detrimentally 
affected. 
The fact that the best protection against any weapon is destroying the 
platform on which the weapon is delivered, is also valid for e-bombs. But 
sometimes this solution can not be easily implemented or even possible. 
 95
In this case, the best protection against e-bombs seems to be hardening 
the electronic equipment against microwave radiation. 
From the defense perspective, in the event of a war, e-bombs could be the 
first kind of weapons to be used against communication systems and air defense 
systems. In such a case, it is vital to prepare by hardening in advance all the 
defensive countermeasures before the attack. 
The most effective method for shielding is to wholly contain the equipment 
in an electrically conductive enclosure, termed a Faraday cage, which prevents 
the electromagnetic field from gaining access to the protected equipment (Kopp, 
1993). But even in this case, since most such equipment must be fed with power 
from the outside world, the penetrations, the cracks, the scams, etc, create a 




Figure 53.   Shielding Effect against e-bomb (Kopp, 1996) 
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Figure 53 shows the effect of shielding the electronic devices. If the 
shielding effectiveness is increased to a level at which the e-bomb lethality range 
does not make sense anymore, use of e-bomb would cease to be a good option 
for the opponent. The counter attack for the shielding is increasing the power of 
the e-bomb source. At some point, however, the breakdown in the atmosphere 
will be a limiting factor for the design of such a high power source-e-bomb. 
The technology for protection from high-power microwave energy through 
topological shielding with terminal protection devices and filter isolation is 
available. It can be used to provide adequate hardening for any level of 
exposure. However, as the incident fluence is increased, the degree of required 
protection becomes more difficult to achieve (Taylor and Giri, 1994). 
As shown in the previous sections, even though a 50 dB shielding 
effectiveness is achieved, there could still be a threat for the electronic devices 
from e-bomb. More shielding effectiveness (i.e., 60, 70 dB) will obviously provide 
a better protection. On the other hand, it may not be possible to retrofit harden 
old systems up to this level. They may require a complete replacement. In simple 
terms, hardening by design in the system acquisition phase would be easier and 
cheaper and more effective than attempting to harden the existing device (Kopp, 
1993). Even in this case, sometimes the entire topological shielding concept 
could not be a cost-effective approach. Hardening most military systems and 
mass-produces commercial equipment including PCs and communications 
equipment against HPM would add somewhere between from 3% to 10% to the 
total cost, if hardening is engineered into the original design. To retro-fit existing 
military electrical equipment with hardening would add about 10% to the total 
cost (Wood, 1999). 
Other than shielding, passive electronic counter measures such as using 
low probability of intercept (LPI) techniques could be a good way to protect the 
systems. New LPI radar technology is a good example for these measures. If it 
can be achieved to hide the radar emissions from the enemy, there would not be 
any observable target for enemy to launch an e-bomb to attack. 
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Another technique could be to choose an appropriate topology for 
communications networks. In network centric warfare, the ratio of the capability 
of the communication network for all nodes to that of the reference network is 
called network richness (Pace, 2007). The network richness for a network is 
























1                                         (20) 
where 
 RMC  : Reference network connectivity measure 
TN  : # of node 
μK  : node μ capability value (0< K < 1) 
μN  : # of nodes connected to the node μ 
vLμ  : information flow parameter of route γ connecting node μ, v 
  ((0< L < 1) 
vN μ  : # of routes connecting pair of nodes μ, v 
vF μγ  : connection capacity of route γ connecting node μ, v (F is  
   either 0 or 1) 
γd  : # of links of route γ connecting node μ, v. 
According to equation (20), maximum value of network richness can be 1 
where all nodes are connected to each other and all links and nodes have 
maximum capability. A better interactive network topology could be chosen as 
protection against e-bomb attack in order to maintain the operability of the 
network even though some portion of the network may be permanently damaged 
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after the e-bomb attack. The concept here is that the network would self-heal by 
re-routing mission critical information to more robust paths. 
H. MILITARY UTILITY 
Within this study, three types of hypothetical e-bomb have been proposed. 
Such an immature weapon concept will definitely have disadvantages in design 
and application phases. However, the foreseen advantages, as seen in the 
simulation results, make it attractive to put more effort in exploring the military 
utility of such a weapon. 
1. Advantages 
If the e-bomb can be produced, it will definitely be a key element of 
Electronic Warfare (EW). Electronic Attack, one of 3 divisions of EW, involves the 
use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities or 
equipment with the intent of degrading (Scleher, 1999). It is shown in the 
previous sections that such a weapon can most likely produce power outputs that 
exceed the known susceptibility levels of most of electronic devices, even if they 
are shielded. If it can be used as intended in the battlefield, e-bombs can 
potentially permanently damage opponent’s electronic equipment. Or opponent’s 
systems can be upset as a result of e-bomb attack, which gives a reasonable 
time for other assets to attack the enemy forces. 
If the enemy is mostly dependent on a network to maintain command, 
control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR), an e-bomb attack can probably degrade network functionality. Since the 
new generation battlefield concentrates on network centric warfare, one could 
say with confidence that an e-bomb will be an important threat to C4ISR for the 
future battlefield. 
Another advantage of using e-bomb is the multiple effects on enemy 
systems. The first phase of the air war includes suppression of enemy air 
defense (SEAD) systems. Anti-radiation missiles (ARM) are universally accepted 
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weapons in order to accomplish SEAD missions. By comparison, one e-bomb 
can degrade multiple systems of diverse types whereas the ARM is used against 
only one system. When considering the cost/benefit issue of such missiles, the e-
bomb can be an attractive weapon in comparison of ARM.  
Outside the battlefield, there are several industries and institutions that 
support the armed forces such as companies producing defense products, TV 
stations broadcasting anti-propagation programs etc. If these support 
organizations are considered as viable military targets, and if it is considered that 
such buildings are moderately shielded, the e-bomb lethality against these 
targets will be much higher than that achieved against military targets. 
Another major advantage for the e-bomb is that it can be delivered from 
any platform with a navigation-attack system capable of delivering GPS guided 
munitions. As we can expect GPS guided munitions to be the standard weapons 
for almost every platform for the foreseeable future, every platform can deliver e-
bombs. It also gives an advantage to multi-role platforms. 
2. Disadvantages 
The potential lethality range of e-bomb mostly depends on the coupling 
efficiency of electric field strength into the target system. Since the coupling is a 
complex issue and has many parameters, a desirable lethality range can be 
reliable with accurate intelligence of opponent’s system design and protection 
features. Such information is very difficult to obtain. That is why e-bomb damage 
assessment is an area that still needs improvement. 
You will never know precisely how effective the e-bomb devastated the 
system. Even though the damage assessment does not seem possible to decide 
whether a soft kill or a hard kill is achieved; some methods can help to evaluate 
the result of e-bomb attack. Consider that the e-bomb is used against an enemy 
radar. If the e-bomb damaged the target radar, the enemy radar will stop 
transmitting for a long period unless an emission silence has been ordered at 
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that time. That is the result of passive electronic support systems operated to 
assess the electronic activity of the enemy’s emitters could give an idea whether 
the e-bomb devastated the system or not. One can say, the e-bomb attack is 
successful, if the end result was that there is no electronic activity after the attack 
where there was before the attack. 
In the context of targeting military equipment, it must be noted that 
thermionic technology (i.e., vacuum tube equipment) is 
substantially more resilient to the electromagnetic weapons effects 
than solid state (i.e., transistor) technology. Therefore a weapon 
optimized to destroy solid state computers and receivers may 
cause little or no damage to a thermionic technology device. 
Therefore a hard electrical kill may not be achieved against such 
targets unless a suitable weapon is used. (Kopp, 1993). 
Another limitation of designing the e-bomb is the atmospheric limitation. In 
order to overwhelm this limitation, the waveguide and the reflector can be 
vacuumed and filled with appropriate gas to increase the breakdown limitation. In 
application, high breakdown limits such as 100 MV/m do not seem realistic. This 
is a big barrier to the technological improvement of such weapons. 
The antenna is also a limiting factor for e-bombs. More effective range 
depends on the aperture size of the reflector. Since a big antenna is not 
appropriate in terms of delivering e-bombs to long distances, improvements in 
this area need to be achieved in the future. Arraying antennas might be worth 
investigating.  
The accuracy of delivery can be another disadvantage for e-bombs. Our 
notional high-tech e-bomb has a potential upset range up to 15 km against 
military systems. If the e-bomb cannot be delivered to the intended point in the 
battlefield, it will obviously decrease effects considerably. 
A notional low-tech (small) e-bomb has been introduced to show that it is 
easily designed with commercially available devices and does not require high 
level engineering experience. Moreover, that low-tech e-bomb is shown to 
produce power output more than the susceptibility level of unshielded systems up 
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to 3 km. Many electronic systems don’t have any shielding. Terrorists can 
produce such weapons easily for use against civilian systems. It can lead to 
temporary panic in daily life. 
The possibility that enemies or terrorists will have such weapons indicates 
the advisability of shielding our own assets. This necessity will increase 
production and maintenance cost of such systems. 
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IV. COMPARISON OF WEAPONS BY USING MULTIPLE 
OBJECTIVE DECISION MAKING 
No matter how rich and prosperous, a nation without 
independence, cannot be subject to any behavior before the 
humanity, at a higher level than serving.  
— Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
After all the information proposed in the previous chapters, is it worthwhile 
to invest in research and development of an e-bomb? Even if such a weapon can 
be produced, is it really as lethal as other electromagnetic weapons? What would 
make proposed e-bombs attractive in comparison with other weapons? All these 
questions can be addressed using the method of Multi-Objective Decision 
Making. 
Utilizing the information presented in the previous chapters, formulation for 
the comparison among the three types of weapons (the HEMP, the HPM, and the 
e-bomb) is detailed in this chapter.  In order to do this, multi-objective decision 
analysis are used to assess the three types of weapons. 
This chapter proceeds as follows:  some basic principles are defined to 
introduce Multi-Objective Decision Making; a model is proposed in order to 
compare electromagnetic weapons; and the output is analyzed. 
A. MULTIPLE OBJECTIVE DECISION 
Decision making is defined in the open literature as: 
Decision making is the process of selecting a possible course of 
action from all the available alternatives. In almost all such 
problems multiplicity of criteria for assessing alternatives is 
pervasive. That is, for many such problems, the decision-maker 
wants to attain more than one objective or goal while satisfying the 
constraints dictated by environment, processes, and resources. 
Another characteristic of these problems is that the objectives are 
frequently appear to be non-commensurable (Hwang and Masud, 
1979). 
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Since the early 1960s, a large and diverse literature has been published in 
order to solve the multiple-objective decision problems that occurs because of 
the complexity of diverse situations and the multiplicity of factors that are 
involved. Theoretical and methodological developments have been based on a 
number of different opinions, reflecting the breadth of disciplines involved 
(Chankong and Haimes, 1983). 
Multi-objective decision making involves an entire process of problem 
solving. A lucid description of the corresponding decision situation that defines 
the problem structure and the decision environment of the decision problem is a 
fundamental to a multi-objective decision problem. Such description can be 
accomplished by identifying the boundaries and the basic components of the 
problem. If the multi-objective decision process and the decision situation is 
considered as a black box, structurally, there will be some input information, and 
a process that is defined by the decision maker. As a result, a decision will be 
produced as output (Chankong and Haimes, 1983). 
One way to make a multi-objective decision is to estimate the overall 
measure of effectiveness of each alternative. The approach of measure of 
effectiveness of any system depends on five key components: The decision-
maker, a set of alternatives (course of actions), the environment in which the 
alternatives are shaped, a set of objectives and a set of decision rule. The flow 
diagram of this process is shown in Figure 54. According to the output of this 
process, some alternatives come better than others depending on the 
preferences of the decision maker.  
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Figure 54.   Measure of Effectiveness Model (Airola, 2007) 
After defining the alternatives and the battle scenario (environment), the 
key step in evaluating each alternative is to define the objectives that are to be 
measured. The most common method to define the objectives and related sub-
objectives is additive value model. Overall measure of effectiveness can be 
expressed in “additive value model.” This model defines the objectives in a 
hierarchical structure in which the relevant objectives are grouped as a set of 
objectives. Objectives at the lower level in the hierarchical structure are more 
specific and more operational than those at the higher level. That is, the 
objectives at the lowest level of the hierarchy are the most specific and the most 
operational objectives overall (Chankong and Haimes, 1983).  
For multiple objective decision making, structuring the objective hierarchy 
is the most important step. Objective hierarchy permits you to go from multiple 
objectives to a single measure of effectiveness (Airola, 2007). 
An objective defined in the structure gets operational if the level of 
achieving such an objective can be assessed in a practical way. To make the 
objective operational, each objective is defined in terms of a group of attributes in 
the lowest level. An attribute is a measurable quantity whose measured value 
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reflects the degree of achievement for a particular objective. An attribute can be 
measured in quantity even though the achievement is defined in qualitative terms 
(Chankong and Haimes, 1983). The relation between an objective and an 
attribute is defined in open literature:  
In many instances, the value of an attribute will give an obvious and 
direct indication of the degree of achieving an associated objective. 
These are called the proxy attributes. For example, the attribute 
“net profit” measured in terms of dollars is a direct measurement of 
the degree of achieving the objective “maximizing profit.” For some 
problems, it may be possible to formulate accurately the multi-
objective decision problem in such a way that objectives and 
attributes are related only by direct relationships. This type of direct 
relationship between objectives and attributes is, indeed, what we 
would like to have. The idea of articulating objectives into 
hierarchical levels is, in fact, a way of achieving this goal. For each 
objective in the lowest level there should ideally exist an attribute or 
a set of attributes whose value is a direct measurement of the level 
of achieving that objective (Chankong and Haimes, 1983).  
Proxy attributes are operationally measurable and assessable. They are 
also controllable. That is, whatever the decision-maker does, it affects the 
attributes. Another property of attributes is to be mutually exclusive, in order to 
avoid double counting.  
Once the hierarchical structure is designed, the next step is to define the 
model mathematically. In this case I will use an additive value model where the 
value of the model depends on the added value of each objective/attribute and 
the assigned weight of the objective/attribute. The additive value model is 
expressed mathematically as 
.....)()()( 222111 ++= AvwAvwAv                               (21) 
where )(Av is alternative’s value, i is the number of the value measured, iA  is the 
alternative’s score on the ith value measure, )(Avi  is single dimensional value of 
score of iA , and iw  is the weight of i








and Henderson, 2008). 
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Value functions measure returns to scale on the value measures. There 
are four basic shapes: linear, concave, convex, and an S-curve. In the linear 
value function, each increment of the measure is equally valuable and adds 
same value to overall measure. In the concave value function, each increment of 
the measurement is worth less than the preceding increment and adds less value 
to overall measure. In the convex value function, each increment of the measure 
is worth more than the preceding increment and adds more value to overall 
measure. And finally, the S-curve has the characteristic of both convex and 
concave since it involves both value functions (Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson, 
2008). For the model proposed in this study, a simple linear value function will be 
used for each of the attributes. 
After defining the ranges for each objective/attribute, and measuring the 
value, the next step is to find the additive value of individual objective/attribute to 
the overall effectiveness. Every individual measure of effectiveness has value 
associated with it. This allows decision makers to convert disparate measures 
(km, tons, lbs, %availability etc) into a common unit, effectiveness. It also sets 
bounds on needed performances. Figure 58 shows an example of how to 
compute the value function using the linearity. As mentioned before, it is 
assumed that all value functions are linear. The value function is given by 
enoughnotenoughgood
enoughnotvaluemeasuredAvi −
−=)(                                    (22) 
where measured value is the measurement of specific objective/attribute, not 
enough is the down limit of the range of individual objective/attribute, and good 
enough is the upper limit of the range of individual objective/attribute. “not 
enough” and “good enough” values are defined by decision-makers. By doing 
this calculation, a linear scale is established between minimum value (0) and 
maximum value (1).  
After calculating each individual attribute’s value function, the last step in 
calculating the overall measure of effectiveness is to apply equation (21). For any 
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level of objectives/attributes in the hierarchical structure, the total measure of 
effectiveness is expressed by the sum of products of each attribute’s additive 
value and the assigned weight of that attribute.  
Weights play a key role in the measure of effectiveness model. The 
weights can be considered as the mirror of the decision-maker since the 
decision-maker’s preferences will form the priorities in the attributes or 
objectives. Weights assigned to each individual objective/attribute and the 
defined range to set the best and the worst value for individual 
objective/attributes directly affect the result of measure of effectiveness. That is 
why the decision-makers must be careful and sensitive while forming the 
measure of effectiveness structure, deciding on the assigned weights and 
defining the ranges. There are many subjective ways to determine the weights, 
but there are some other ways that the weights are assigned more precisely, in 
which the preferences of the group are represented in a better way. One 
common way to assess weights from a group of experts is defined in the open 
literature as:  
• Vote. (Have each individual spread 100 points over the value 
measures based on the measures’ range.) 
• Discuss significant differences. Have the “outliers” discuss 
their rationales. 
• Revote until the group agrees on the ordinal ranking of the 
value measures. 
• Vote again requiring each person’s weights to follow the 
group’s ordinal ranking of the value measures. 
• Average the weights (cardinal ranking of weights) and 
normalize so they sum to one. 
• Discuss significant differences. Have the “outliers” discuss 
their rationales. 
• Repeat last two steps until the group agrees (Parnell, 
Driscoll, and Henderson, 2008). 
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According to this approach, if there are disagreements about the weights 
that can not be resolved, they must be recorded for later evaluation of 
alternatives in order to do a sensitivity analysis to determine if they are 
significant. Mostly, the preferred alternatives are not sensitive to the weight range 
evaluated (Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson, 2008). 
For this study, a common-sense approach will be used to assign the 
weight for each attributes and the objectives. 
B. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS MODEL FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC 
WEAPONS 
Measure of effectiveness model for electromagnetic weapons is slightly 
different from any model for lethal weapons. The most important features of 
electromagnetic weapons are that they are not lethal, not explosive, but capable 
of degrading the opponent’s electronic systems. Since there is no 
published/proven electromagnetic weapon on the shelf, the proposed model will 
assess mostly the qualitative aspect of electromagnetic weapons. Since the 
purpose of this study is to show whether the e-bomb is worthy of R&D facilities, 
the proposed model is intended to be useful to make a recommendation for this 
question. 
The effectiveness of electromagnetic weapons are evaluated under five 
objectives: Design, Compatibility, Lethality, Operational Suitability and Human 
Factors. Each of them are identified, including the sub-objectives/attributes. 
Then, they are weighted according to the importance given by the author of the 
study. Next, the acceptable range for each individual attribute will be defined, and 
finally, assigned value if each attribute is computed to show the overall 
effectiveness on electromagnetic weapons. Figure 55 shows the proposed 
measure of effectiveness model structure. 
Various colors show the separation between the levels in the hierarchy. 
According to the color designation, pink represents second level, yellow 
represents third level and blue represents fourth level of objectives/attributes. 
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Figure 55.   Measure of Effectiveness Model for Electromagnetic Weapons 
The weights assigned to each individual second level objective are: 
• DESIGN    : 0.10 
• COMPATIBILITY   : 0.15 
• LETHALITY    : 0.50 
• OPERATIONAL SUITABILITY : 0.20 
• HUMAN FACTORS   : 0.05 
 
The most important measurement for comparing the weapons is of course 
the lethality. Even though electromagnetic weapons are non-lethal weapons 
against human, there is still a lethality issue against electronic systems. For this 
objective, it is intended to give more effectiveness to the weapon with more effect 
on electronic systems. More lethality means a better electromagnetic weapon. 
The attributes that drive lethality are the lethal range of the weapon, wavelength 
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and pulsewidth of the signal. Lethality range is a measurable factor. The 
expected potential lethality will be used as the lethality range of the notional e-
bomb. 
For the comparison, the lethality range will be determined against a 
specified target. For this study, Swedish fighter aircraft will be that target. The 
second attribute, wavelength, determines the coupling efficiency of the 
electromagnetic weapon. Shorter wavelengths generally offer better coupling 
performance, better power transfer performance, and better antenna 
performance for a given antenna size (Kopp, 1996). The last attribute, 
pulsewidth, is an important determinant of damage threshold power. The damage 
threshold power required for thermal second breakdown is given by 
τ
KAP JD =                                                   (24) 
where JA  is the junction area of representative electronic device, K is the 
proportionality constant and τ is the pulsewidth of the signal (Taylor and Giri, 
1994). According to equation (24), the higher pulsewidth results in lower damage 
threshold power. That is, less power is enough to create a damage effect on 
target. For the measure of effectiveness model, the greater pulsewidth is better in 
order to provide damage on intended target. The “weights,” “good enough” and 
“not enough” values are provided in Table 19 for lethality range, pulsewidth and 
wavelength. 
 
Attributes Weights Good Enough Not Enough 
Lethality Range 0.70 200 km 1 km 
Wavelength 0.15 0.05 m 2.0 m 
Pulsewidth 0.15 1000 ns 10 ns 
Table 19.   MOE values for lethality attributes 
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The second most important objective is operational suitability.  By 
Operational suitability measures the role of the weapon in the battlefield. Some 
weapons are used to defend the units/systems where others are used to 
attack/destroy enemy units/forces. Similarly, some weapons are effective only on 
one target where others are mass-destructive. For the comparison of 
electromagnetic weapons in terms of the operational suitability, two attributes are 
proposed to drive the effectiveness: Multiplier effect and Defense/Offense 
Capability. Multiplier effect is the ability of electromagnetic weapon to achieve 
kills against multiple targets of diverse types within its lethal footprint. This is 
defined as qualitative measurement in the model. Assessment is made whether 
the weapon is capable of achieving this particular mission or not. The second 
attribute, Defense/Offense Capability, is the definition of electromagnetic weapon 
in terms of tactical usage. For the comparison, an offensive weapon is assumed 
better than a defensive weapon. The “weights,” “good enough” and “not enough” 
values are provided in Table 20 for operational suitability attributes. 
 
Attributes Weights Good Enough Not Enough 
Multiplier Effect 0.70 YES=1 NO=0.5 
Defense/Offense Capability 0.30 Offensive=1 Defensive=0 
Table 20.   MOE values for operational suitability attributes 
The third objective is the compatibility, the integration of the 
electromagnetic weapon with different platforms (degree of usability with navy, 
army or air forces). This attribute is measured qualitatively. One weapon can be 
compatible with surface ships, but not aircrafts. If it is compatible with any 
platform, it adds value to the compatibility measure. Compatibility with air forces 
is considered to be the most important since most electromagnetic weapons are 
meant to be used as SEAD (suppression of enemy air defense) operation. It is  
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assumed that in the future, mostly air forces will use the electromagnetic 
weapons. The “weights,” “good enough” and “not enough” values are provided in 
Table 21 for compatibility attributes. 
 
Attributes Weights Good Enough Not Enough 
Air Forces 0.50 YES=1 NO=0 
Navy 0.25 YES=1 NO=0 
Army 0.25 YES=1 NO=0 
Table 21.   MOE values for compatibility attributes 
The design (physical and technical characteristics) of an electromagnetic 
weapon either for bomb or missile application, is an important issue. The size, 
weight, complexity and packaging are main factors that drive the design of 
electromagnetic weapon. The size of the weapon can limit the power source, in 
turn constraining the lethality and means of delivery. If the size is small, the 
required power to damage the target can not be packed into the weapon. 
Similarly, if the size is large, in this case it will limit the flexible use of weapon. 
That is, the weapon can be used to defend any unit, but can not be delivered as 
a missile. For the proposed model, qualitative measures will be used to define 
the size of the weapons. Small and large size is not good, where moderate size 
is more desirable for electromagnetic weapons. Weight can also be a limiting 
factor for the means of delivery. If it is a heavy weapon, it can not be delivered as 
missile or glide bombs. In this case, a lighter weapon is more desirable. Weight is 
also a qualitative measurement. Another attribute, packaging, is the ability of 
electromagnetic weapon to be packed in different warheads such as bombs, 
glide bombs, missiles etc. This flexibility can provide tactical advantage for the 
electromagnetic weapon. If any weapon can be carried within a cruise missile, or 
stand-off missile, the operational effectiveness of the weapon will clearly 
increase. The packaging attributes are measured whether the weapon has that 
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individual flexibility or not. The last attribute under the design is the complexity. 
Since the technology is not mature in this area, a qualitative value is assigned to 
each electromagnetic weapon according to the technological complexity for 
design. The “weights,” “good enough” and “not enough” values are provided in 
Table 22 for design attributes. 
 
Attributes Weights Good Enough Not Enough 
Size 0.25 Moderate=1 Small,Large=0
Weight 0.25 Light=1 Heavy=0 
Packaging 0.25   
Bomb 0.14 YES=1 NO=0 
Glide Bomb 0.14 YES=1 NO=0 
ASM 0.14 YES=1 NO=0 
SAM 0.14 YES=1 NO=0 
Stand-off Missile 0.16 YES=1 NO=0 
AAM 0.14 YES=1 NO=0 
Cruise Missile 0.14 YES=1 NO=0 
Complexity 0.25 LOW HIGH 
Table 22.   MOE values for design attributes 
The last objective is human factors. There are two attributes defined as 
drivers for human factors: non-lethality and environmental effect. Even though all 
electromagnetic weapons are meant to be non-lethal weapons, non-lethality is 
considered to be an important attribute, which is shown in the proposed model. If 
the weapon is not lethal, it is assumed that it is better for humanity. The other 
attribute is the environmental effect of the electromagnetic weapon. It is generally 
accepted that biological effects from radiation occur as a result of power 
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absorption. For animals and humans, this process is complicated by non-uniform 
power absorption and the internal thermal regulation process. Clayborne and Giri 
define biological effects due to the radiation (Taylor and Giri, 1994). According to 
the data, exposure levels less than 100 W/m2 does not have any biological effect. 
For human factors, the less biologically effective weapon is the better 
electromagnetic weapon. The exposure level will be converted to the range in 
meters.  Corresponding range represents the maximum range that an 
electromagnetic weapon can have biologic effects on humans. Figure 56 shows 
the maximum biological range of high-tech e-bomb. Beyond 522 meters, one can 
say the e-bomb is not dangerous to humans. 


























Average power density of E-bomb
 
Figure 56.   Maximum biological effect range of e-bomb 
The “weights,” “good enough” and “not enough” values are provided in Table 23 
for human factors attributes. 
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Attributes Weights Good Enough Not Enough 
Non-lethality 0.50 YES=1 NO=0 
Biological Effect 0.50 500 m 10,000 m 
Table 23.   MOE values for human factors attributes 
At the very least, the method of analysis for measure of effectiveness 
proposed in this study offers a way to choose the numerical quantities related to 
the electromagnetic weapons that are consistent with each other, with an 
assumed objective, and with the decision-maker’s expectation of the future. The 
methods provides its answers by process that are accessible to critical 
examination, capable of duplication by others, and more or less, readily modified 
as new information becomes available. 
Figure 57 shows the MOE of EM weapons with weights. 
 
Figure 57.   Measure of Effectiveness Model for Electromagnetic Weapons with 
weights 
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C. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL OUTPUT 
The specification of each electromagnetic weapon in terms of the measure 
of effectiveness attributes is defined in Table 24. For the hypothetical e-bomb, 
high-tech (powerful) e-bomb will be used as reference. 
 
Specifications HEMP HPM Weapon E-Bomb 
Design    
Size Moderate Large Moderate 
Weight Light Heavy Light 
Packaging    
Bomb NO NO YES 
Glide Bomb YES NO YES 
ASM NO NO YES 
SAM YES NO YES 
Stand-off Missile NO NO YES 
AAM YES NO YES 
Cruise Missile YES NO YES 
Complexity HIGH MODERATE MODERATE 
Compatibility    
Air Forces YES YES YES 
Army YES YES YES 
Navy NO YES YES 
Lethality    
Range 450 km* ~10 km 160 km** 
Pulsewidth 500 ns 1000 ns 100 ns 
Wavelength 1.5 m 0.1 m 0.15 m 
Operational Suitability    
Multiplier Effect YES YES YES 
Defense/Offense 
Capability 
Offense Defense Offense 
Human Factors    
Non-lethality YES YES YES 
Biological Effect*** 27,272 m 538 m 522 m 
Table 24.   MOE Specification of Electromagnetic Weapons 
* As mentioned before, the electric field measured in Honolulu (800 miles 
away from the Starfish test facility) was 5.4 kV/m. Such an electric field will have 
field strength of 15 kV/m (the threshold level for Swedish Fighter) at 450 km. 
** Even though the lethality range of proposed e-bomb against Swedish 
Fighter Aircraft is about 10 km, since the e-bomb can be delivered as cruise 
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missile, or any other missile, the average reasonable range of the missile (150 
km) is added the lethality range of e-bomb. 
*** Biological effect ranges are calculated by estimating the range at which 
the power density becomes 100 W/m2. 
For the specifications of the HEMP, the open literature data has been 
used. For HPM weapon specifications, the proposed weapon (f=3 GHz, antenna 
aperture = 100 m2, pulsewidth=1000 ns) by Clayborne and Giri has been used. 
Using the data given in Table 24, each electromagnetic weapon is 
assessed in terms of the effectiveness model proposed by this study. 
Figure 58 shows the measure of effectiveness organization with weights 
and attribute values. 
 
Figure 58.   MOE of HEMP 
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Figure 59.   Single attribute calculations for HEMP 
After finding the single individual attributes (Figure 59), the additive value 












The same methodology is applied to measure the effectiveness of HPM 
weapon. Figure 60 shows the MOE structure for HPM weapon including 
assigned weights and the measurements/assumptions of each attributes. 
 
Figure 60.   MOE of HPM Weapon 
 121
 
Figure 61.   Single attribute calculations for HPM weapon 
When same single attribute calculation is done (see Figure 61) and the 
additive value method is applied, the overall effectiveness of HPM weapon is 
found to be 0.5162. And finally, the same method is followed for the 
measurement of effectiveness for e-bomb. Measured/assumed values for an e-




Figure 62.   MOE of E-Bomb 
The single attribute calculation (see Figure 63) and the additive value 




Figure 63.   Single attribute calculations for E-Bomb 
Since, technologically similar methods are applied to produce such 
weapons, and there is no reported electromagnetic weapon that has a credible 
cost estimate, the costs for all electromagnetic weapons proposed in this study 
are assumed to have same magnitude of cost. This turns the problem into a 
“maximizing the effectiveness” problem. When three effectiveness models are 
compared, one can realize that the proposed e-bomb has the best effectiveness 
among all other options. Surely, the analysis has so many deficiencies. However, 
if it is considered that there is no real weapon in this area, the purpose of this 
study can be understood better. This study tries to show that in the future, such 
weapons will have an important role in the battlefield. Among these weapons, the 
e-bomb deserves to get the most attention for exploring. 
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Another interpretation could be that the e-bomb is a mass-destructive non-
nuclear electromagnetic weapon. When considering that the HEMP is know as 
the electromagnetic effect of the nuclear bomb, the cost-effectiveness analysis 
shows that the e-bomb has also same effect with HEMP.  
The HPM weapons are large in size and weight and have a short range. 
These features make it a fixed weapon. That is why the effectiveness of the HPM 
weapon is relatively less than the other two electromagnetic weapons. In fact, 
with its huge design, it is not useful in the battlefield for offensive purposes. It 
can, however, be used as a defensive weapon against missiles.  
On the other hand, HPM weapons are important because they provide the 
theory for proposed hypothetical e-bombs. With different applications, such as 
missile, cruise missile etc. the e-bomb can be used as effectively as HEMP.  
The proposed model to measure the effectiveness of electromagnetic 
weapons is believed to be organized to give the best effectiveness analysis. 
However, it is open to interpretation. Nevertheless, since the qualitative data in 
this study is limited, and the qualitative data provided is calculated based on the 
published theoretical data rather than physical measurement, the output of the 
model may be accordingly inaccurate. If the real data for the proposed model can 
be measured in the future,  the output of the model will be at least somewhat 
different from the output of this study. 
If satisfactory solutions can be found for future problems in e-bomb 
design, e-bombs promise to be an important and robust weapon in both strategic 
and tactical operations, offering significantly reduced collateral damage and 
lower human casualties than established weapons. 
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V. E-BOMB IN MILITARY RIVALRY 
In a future war where all sides depend heavily on electronic 
systems, weaponry and command and control, a weapon that 
disrupts and damages these systems will be extremely valuable. If 
it can perform this function at the speed of light, with minimal prior 
target information and with minimum collateral damage, it will be 
especially useful (Bolkcom and Tatman 1997). 
The rules of battle have changed over the entirety of military history. Tools 
such as technology, strategy, tactics and weapons have been the principal 
elements determining what kind of rules apply to the battlefield. Accordingly, the 
rules of the future battlefield are indicated now. Foreseeing future battlefields, 
and projecting the technologies on which future systems will be based, plays a 
major role in maintaining a lead position in the military affairs. The country, and 
its armed forces, must predict the future appropriately and prepare for better than 
its rivals. 
Can our hypothetical e-bomb be a significant weapon for the future 
battlefield? Can the country that first develops this new weapon have a 
significant and exploitable military advantage against other powers? 
This chapter attempts to answer these questions by discussing the future 
battlefield and offering a prediction about its principal rules and elements. Military 
competition in the world, and the elements that bear on the rivalry, can then be 
explained. Also, this study attempts to clarify the potential role of e-bombs. 
Finally, the overall implications of the hypothetical e-bomb are analyzed. 
A. THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE 
Military success against other countries depends on actions taken to 
prepare for the future. The military advantage obtainable with e-bombs is related 
mostly to their operational significance.  
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The framework of the battlefield of the future, as defined by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the status of Military Technical Revolutions are published in 
open literature: 
In order to plan for the battlefield of the future, the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff released a report called Joint Vision 2010. This 
report offers a broad framework for understanding joint warfare in 
the future. It also directs US armed forces acquisition programs in 
obtaining capabilities to run military operations using precision 
engagement, dominant maneuvers, and focused logistics while 
providing full dimensional protection of forces and assets in 
combat. JV2010 is a reflection of the basic belief that a revolution in 
military affairs is occurring, and it assumes that new capabilities are 
needed to cope with that Military Technical Revolution (MTR). 
There have been perhaps a dozen revolutions in military affairs 
since the fourteenth century. One began when the United States 
detonated its first atomic bomb in the early 1945 Trinity test. The 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki detonations in August 1945 helped end 
World War II. In that same war, the Japanese experimented with 
germ warfare by spreading bubonic plague agents on Chinese 
population centers via bombing missions. Also in WWII, the 
Germans manufactured—but did not use—Sarin and Tabun nerve 
gases. These nuclear, biological, and chemical armaments now 
form a new "trinity" of weapons of mass destruction that threaten to 
make twenty-first-century warfare more costly than  anything seen 
before (Schneider and Grinter, 1998). 
In the United States, the principles of war are described by the acronym 
MOSSCOMES (Schneider and Grinter, 1998): 
• M - Mass 
• O - Offensive 
• S - Surprise 
• S - Security 
• C - Command Unity 
• O - Objective 
• M - Maneuver 
• E - Economy of Force 
• S – Simplicity 
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No matter the era, these principles will be the basis of the war. One of 
these principles, mass, is most likely to drive the battlefield of the future. A new 
era in warfare may well be marked by the proliferation of weapons of mass effect. 
These confer the advantages to be gained by simultaneity and depth of attack, 
information dominance, and accurate targeting which is defined in different terms 
in JV2010. For example, with the revolution in accuracy, hundreds of aircraft do 
not need to drop thousands of bombs to destroy a single target. Instead, one 
aircraft can deliver a precision weapons to destroy targets and obtain the same 
results formerly requiring hundreds of sorties. 
Research and development work is currently underway on “information 
warfare” in hopes of transforming the way wars are fought. In short, it is a method 
for revolutionizing the battlefield of the future using information technology (Giri, 
2004). Noting that the microprocessors have doubled in speed every 18 months 
(Patterson, 1995), it is reasonable to conclude that information warfare will do 
much to shape the future battlefield. 
Fast information flow is getting more and more important every day. Giant 
organizations such as government, the military, and industry cannot function 
without fast information flow. The common point of the systems used in these 
sectors is that they are all built with modern, high-density semiconductor 
components. Dependency upon these semiconductor components results in 
more and more vulnerable systems due to the rapid advance of technology. That 
is, data and communication structures will remain a soft electromagnetic target 
for the near future. That is because nobody wants to pay for hardening these 
systems (yet). Hence, there is a fundamental and growing electromagnetic 
infrastructure vulnerability, exploitable by terrorists (and others) in the near future 
(Benford, Swegle and Schamiloglu, 2007). 
The emergence of information warfare would definitely add new methods 
of destroying opponent’s targets and disrupting the operations. In this new way of 
warfare, independent information warfare operations could be the first phase of 
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the war, since it includes covert attack with adaptable, time-phased computer 
viruses. Following the first phase, overt attacks using anti-satellite and media 
override operations, conventional electromagnetic pulse weapons for area 
effects, and HPM weapon attacks would disable specific targets. In addition to 
offensive measures, such as temporarily or permanently disabling an opponent’s 
sensor and information-processing systems, integrated information warfare 
operations could also mislead an opposing force as to the size, location, and 
orientation of friendly forces (Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, 1997). 
One of the defined electromagnetic weapons, HEMP, and the resultant 
electromagnetic pulse, is believed to render most allied space assets inert. 
Electromagnetic pulse radiating from such a weapon could burn out the circuitry 
of most allied radio systems, computers, transistors, and power grids in the 
region of combat — rendering many of the allies' high-tech assets harmless 
(Schneider and Grinter, 1998). This gives an important role to such weapons in 
the information warfare of the future battlefield.  
Another report defines the possible information warfare threats to the U.S. 
in 2010 (Miller, 2005). According to this report, Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
will play an important role and start a new era in the battlefield of the future. The 
operational advantages conferred by NCW depend on networking sensors, 
increasing speed of command, accelerating the tempo of operations, and 
achieving greater lethality, through data links, displays, computerized planning 
systems, GPS receivers, radios, satellite communications, smart munitions, 
aircraft, and so on. The power of NCW is directly related to the performance of 
microchip-enabled systems, which are used in nearly every element of NCW. 
And, of course, as a response to this emerging warfare, new threats will show up.  
The electromagnetic circuit vulnerability seems the weakest aspect of NCW. 
Accordingly, weapons that will exploit the vulnerability of NCW will become a 
major threat. 
The environmental effect of conventional weapons is another 
consideration for future battlefields. It is obvious that the effects of future 
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conventional weapons will be more than existing conventional weapons. One can 
say that this will put increased pressure on military planning and lead us to 
explore new ways of warfare. There are no longer sharp lines in the new 
battlefield to identify the situation as clear-cut as there once were. In this new 
way of war, more ambiguity and difficulty on deciding the “good” and “bad” guys 
make the situations more difficult to identify. The shared interest in the battlefield 
has been changed. In this new era, the military operations mostly focus on 
transnational threats rather than survival or protecting the freedom of the citizens. 
This removes the sharp boundaries of the war and makes them less clear. As a 
result, the risks to civilian life and infrastructure get higher. Moreover, military 
forces are often deployed to situations that require close proximity to non-
combatant civilians. In addition to the changes in types of threats and the 
corresponding reaction of military force, there is also the issue of controlling 
weapon lethality levels and collateral damage. 
The potential effect of mass destruction weapons has been made clear 
since World War II when the nuclear weapon was first used. It has changed the 
look of people to the strategic weapons. Existing strategic weapons with 
increased lethality are now too deadly for our own good — and the good of the 
planet. In addition to improving the accuracy and the precision of 
conventional/non-conventional weapons, a number of new options to utilize the 
lethality levels of such weapons are being explored. Even though the cost of the 
weapons itself can seem relatively normal, the cost in terms of large-scale 
casualties of civilians, the environment, and the infrastructure in a war zone can 
be tremendous in modern warfare. An analysis of cost and advantages of 
modern conventional weapons has created new arguments. Such studies show 
that it is no longer advisable to continue in our current direction. That is why the 
conventional weapons with incredible lethality concept may soon be superseded, 
even though they seem as the only foundation for defense. The new battlefield of 
the future in the twenty-first century makes new strategies and techniques for 
combat already available. These new strategies and weapons are designed to 
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minimize casualties on all sides by being nonlethal in nature. Such weapons are 
called as “nonlethal weapons” and represent an entirely new classes of nonlethal 
weapons in the warfare that could minimize the lethality. The main purpose of 
such weapons, at least in theory, is to degrade the enemy’s capabilities by 
damaging the systems while causing minimal loss of life. The traditional warfare 
with conventional weapons is still a major impact in the battlefield, and nonlethal 
measures are not being proposed as a replacement for conventional weapons. 
However, there is trend for nonlethal technologies to consider them as a strategic 
alternative (or supplement) to bloodshed — an intermediate option that allows for 
a reduction of indiscriminate death and destruction (Giri, 2004). 
The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board’s recently published a report about 
directed energy and HPM technology, which is one of directed energy 
applications. The following statement by the board explains the future battlefield 
and the importance of nonlethal weapons: 
Promising present-day research in high power microwave (HPM) 
technology allows us to envision a whole new range of compact 
weapons that will be highly effective in the sophisticated, electronic 
battlefield environment of the future. There are many advantages of 
these HPM weapons: First, there are virtually no target acquisition, 
pointing, and tracking requirements in any HPM weapon 
employment scenario. Electromagnetic radiation, traveling at the 
speed of light, will envelop a large volume that can engage multiple 
targets at once. HPM weapons could be used in nearly all large 
volume that can engage multiple targets at once. HPM weapons 
could be used in nearly all weather, although frequencies above 10 
GHz degrade somewhat. HPM weapons designs could be 
employed in a convert way since the beam is not visible and the 
damage and/or upset could be directed to electronic targets. Since 
in many applications the only expendable is fuel for electrical 
generators, HPM weapons are expected to come with a large 
“magazine.” It may be possible to design a system that acts as both 
radar and weapon, which first detects and tracks the target and 
then increases the power and engages the target, all at electronic 
speeds. Finally, a distinct advantage of HPM lies in the fact that it 
may be considered a nonlethal weapon that would prevent the 
enemy from using his electronic equipment successfully with no 
impact on human life (AFSAB, 1995). 
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According to the published reports, one can say that overall dependency 
of military operations on electronic systems will keep increasing. However, this 
will increase vulnerability to electromagnetic weapons. The “mass” principle of 
the war will still be an important element in the future. Therefore, the exploration 
of electromagnetic weapons in designing as a mass destructive weapons against 
electronic system may be a new manifestation of the “mass” principle. Thus, 
information warfare will play an important role in battlefield success. 
Also, success in Network Centric Warfare will be a decisive factor in 
victory on the battlefield. Improving electronic technology will make information 
warfare and NCW more effective in speed, accuracy, detecting, targeting, 
lethality etc. However, NCW is more vulnerable against electromagnetic 
weapons. And, the smaller size and the simplicity of such weapons will make 
these weapons more useful, and available, as countermeasures to NCW.  
Accordingly, both terrorists and traditional military organizations can be expected 
to explore the potential of e-bombs. 
B. MILITARY RIVALRY AT PRESENT AND IN NEAR FUTURE 
The military technical revolution for the close future of battlefield has been 
identified in open literature: 
Over the next two decades, an emerging military technical 
revolution (MTR) could have profound consequences for global 
strategic balances. Driven by a broader information revolution, the 
emerging MTR could transform war on land, in the air, and at sea, 
and bring war into two new dimensions – space and the information 
spectrum. Although the nuclear revolution can be expected to have 
a continuing, truncating effect on the strategic scope of the 
emerging MTR, the advent of a post-MTR military regime would 
complicate planning and result in increased stratification of military 
capabilities. The United States will almost assuredly enter this 
period of transformational change well in advance of other 
competitors, but others inevitably will follow. Asymmetries in 
strategic requirements, moreover, should cause some competitors 
to emphasize significantly different aspects of the post-MTR regime 
(Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, 1997). 
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Military revolutions have always been the major discontinuity in military 
rivalry. Such discontinuity occurs by changes in relevant technologies, concepts 
of operations, methods of organization, and/or resources available. Relatively 
abruptly, they alter the conduct of war in a different way and enable order of 
magnitude gains in military effectiveness for the side that made the military 
technical revolution. Overall, they create a big difference between military 
regimes in terms of the military advantage (Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, 1997). 
A number of definitions for “military-technical revolution” have been 
introduced in open literature, including: 
Geoffrey Parker, discussing the “military-revolution” of 1500-1800 
noted major changes in European warfare – battlefield technology, 
tactics, size of armies, new strategies for larger armies, plus wide-
ranging political and societal changes. A study from Georgetown 
University’s Center for Strategic  and International Studies offers “a 
fundamental advance in technology, doctrine or organization that 
renders existing methods of conducting warfare obsolete.” One US 
Department of Defense (DoD) view is that MTRs occur when 
emerging technologies are applied to military systems, whose use 
are optimized via custom-tailored operational concepts and force 
structures, resulting in vast increases in military effectiveness. No 
matter what definition is used, it is clear that MTRs have an 
important impact on military capability to those able to exploit them. 
Military Technical Revolutions (MTR) are inherently part of military 
competitions (Franck and Hildebrandt, 1996). 
According to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessments 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
 Military Technical Revolution is a major change in the nature of 
warfare brought about by the innovative application of new 
technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military 
doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, 
fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military 
operations.  
One can say that such an MTR is now happening and those who 
understand and applies will definitely take advantage of it and enjoy a decisive 
advantage on the battlefield of the future (Schneider and Grinter, 1998). 
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In future warfare, the struggle for information, in other words “information 
warfare,” will play a central role, taking the place, perhaps, of the struggle for 
geographical position held in previous conflicts. Information superiority is 
emerging as a newly recognized, and more intense, area of possible future 
competition. In response to these developments, command and control systems 
must be designed to provide commanders at all levels the accurate information 
and uninterrupted communications needed to direct the dispersion or 
concentration of their forces and, more importantly, weapons’ effects at the 
decisive point in time and space. One can consider to develop the command and 
control system first and then to choose an appropriate weapon according to the 
design of command and control system structure. This is in interest because any 
new weapon that is the most lethal weapon among all others does not have 
chance to be a master weapon in the battlefield unless it is integrated with the 
command and control system. Moreover, many of the major parts of future 
weapon systems such as Global Positioning System (GPS), worldwide 
communications, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, etc., are already on 
the shelves. The dominating weapon of the future will be the weapon that will be 
inoperable with these global command and control system. Even though the 
conventional weapons developed to interoperate with command and control 
systems can be dominating weapons, it is obvious that any weapon that 
developed for employment against command and control systems could degrade 
significantly the power of the opponent by making the dominating weapons 
useless. 
Future battlefields will be won by the countries that best manage the 
revolution in military affairs. The key aspects of military revolution are defined in 
three words: Defense, Technology and Management. Figure 64 shows how 
these aspects are related and where the military-technical revolution is located. 
The Defense-Technology aspect focuses on the instruments of war no matter 
what the military revolution is about. Military technology plays an important role 
for this aspect. Information warfare falls into this category (Matthews and 
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Treddenick, 2001). Network Centric Warfare also falls into this category. 
Communication and the coordination are important factors for NCW, as 
mentioned above. The Defense-Management aspect focuses on the allocation of 
defense resources. Logistics, acquisition, project management, budgeting etc. 
fall into this category. The last aspect, Technology-Management, focuses on the 
increasingly important policy significance attached to the creation and 
dissemination of technological innovations across the civil-military sector. 
Numerous facets fall into this category, including the development of appropriate 
technology policies to promote invention and innovation, the encouragement of 
higher levels of civil-military integration, and management and control of defense-
related technologies etc. 
 
Figure 64.   The Military-Technical Revolution: Defense, Management and 
Technology (Matthews and Treddenick, 2001) 
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This framework shows that the military revolution of the future does not 
include just the innovation of new technologies. It is more than that as explained 
in the structure. However, it can be seen that military revolution involves mostly 
the technological innovations, new weapon explorations, information 
management, and encouragement in investment of new developments. It is clear 
that the side that can manage all these aspects will be successful in the military 
technical revolution and make differences in military rivalry. 
Technology is not a winner on its own, but it has been, and it will continue 
to be, a critical enabler. If everything else is equal, the side with better technology 
will win.  
When the current military technical revolution is evaluated, one can say 
that the United States has been in an excellent position to derive military 
advantages. Such exploitation has four major acknowledged key elements: 
• The technology must be available. It has been in development for 
at least a quarter century, in both military and civil sectors. 
• The military must recognize the operational potential of the 
technology. American authorities, civilian and military, have 
understood the battlefield potential of the new technology from the 
beginning stages of development. 
• The military establishment must officially accept the implications of 
the new technology, modify its view of warfare accordingly, and 
take the necessary programmatic steps. 
• New military organizations must embody the technology, weapons 
and doctrine fully to exploit the revolution (Franck and Hildebrandt, 
1996). 
Cheng Mengxiong, from the Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering, 
offers an engineer’s perspective of key future developments related to the 
technology that may be key factors in MTR (Matthews and Treddenick, 2001): 
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• Weapons, soldiers and combat platforms will be “information 
intensified” by 2010-2020. 
• Robot sentries, robot engineers and unmanned smart tanks will be 
fielded by 2020. 
• Robot troops will be used in large numbers. 
• High performance microwave will destroy opponents systems. 
The last bullet implies that electromagnetic weapons will be the main 
threat for the future battlefield. Anyone who will explore the potential effect of 
such weapons will be more likely to dominate the information warfare. 
Three available basic approaches are defined in open literature in 
order to respond to opposing military capability: emulations, offsets, 
and bypasses. “Emulation involves replication of forces, typically 
some sort of mirror-imaging, but possibly ways to match rival 
capability through a different combination of forces. An offsetting 
response is likely to be a set of countermeasures to negate military 
effectiveness or disrupt operations. Bypassing responses involve 
developing new means warfare to leapfrog the rival’s capabilities, 
or methods of operation designed to avoid them” (Franck and 
Hildebrandt, 1996). (Summarized in Table 25.) 
Any approach chosen by any country will move that country forward in 
military technical-revolution. Nevertheless, if one assesses the efficacy of each of 
these approaches, it is clear that offsetting and bypassing can contribute more 
than emulating in military rivalry. If the resources and the budget of one country 
are limited, emulating can be a good approach in order to close the gap with 
other countries. In addition, technology that has not yet emerged entails higher 
risks than proven technologies. However, the benefit and advantage that one 
country can get when it succeeds in developing and exploiting a new technology 
can be a big step in military rivalry. Overall, there is a tradeoff between risk and 
possible benefits. Many factors, including available resources, policies, national 
strategies, geopolitical locations etc., must be considered in deciding which 
approach should be chosen in order to stay in the military rivalry. 
 137
A. Emulating 
 1. Mirror image: nearly identical forces 
 2. Substitution: equivalent capabilities with different forces, 
equipment, doctrine, etc. 
B. Offsetting 
 1. Defense: negating the effects of opposing capabilities 
 2. Disruption: dislocation of opposing force operations 
C. Bypassing 
 1. Avoidance: methods of warfare that avoid enemy strengths (making 
them irrelevant if possible) 
 2. New innovation: funding new and better tools of warfare 
Table 25.   Classifications of Responses to Military Innovation (Franck and 
Hildebrandt, 1996) 
MTRs and military competitions can be considered as inseparable since 
any change in one of them will affect the other one. New technology that has 
application in military systems creates opportunities for military innovations, 
which in turn lead to responses, counter-responses and all the interactions of 
military competitions. The nuclear MTR can be a good example for this 
interaction.  
The United States was first to exploit the nuclear MTR by 
developing a large fleet of bombers capable of global strikes. The 
Soviet response was mostly offsetting (extensive air defenses) and 
bypassing (ballistic missiles), but included an emulation component 
(a small strategic bomber force) as well. In turn, the United States 
chose to offset air defenses through a combination of tactics, 
countermeasures, reduced signatures and air-launched missiles – 
and to emulate ballistic missile deployments. (Franck and 
Hildebrandt, 1996). 
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Current U.S. attention to install some defensive systems in some 
European countries to counter theater ballistic missiles is another example of this 
interaction in a contemporary setting  
Finally, technological advance based on the integration of capabilities that 
exist with new ones as they arise, can make a major difference in military 
rivalries. War is still a matter of ideas, emotions and will. The military technology 
and the weapons are just a tool in military rivalry. The masters of the art are to 
put those capabilities together in innovative ways to achieve national objectives. 
Those who can accomplish these can make a difference in the battlefield of the 
future (Tilford, 1995). 
C. THE EFFECT OF E-BOMB IN MILITARY RIVALRY 
Some key factors that can drive the future battlefield have been defined. 
The next military rivalry and the key elements that play a decision-making role in 
military rivalry have been identified. Within this structure, our hypothetical e-bomb 
is a potential weapon that could play a key role in military affairs. The following 
paragraphs will try to explain these aspects. 
Early innovators gain advantages that rivals must redress by one means 
or another (or cease being rivals). In fact, full exploitation of new weapon entails 
effective combinations with other combat arms in new organizations (Franck and 
Hildebrandt, 1996). From this perspective, the e-bomb (if developed and 
deployed) is a new weapon since there is no officially reported e-bomb in the 
world. Any country that can develop such a weapon will likely be the first to 
employ it, and may well dominate this area for a significant period of time.  
One of the principal elements of the war, “mass,” may well be reassessed 
with the advent of e-bombs. It has been shown in this study that the proposed   
e-bomb has significant battlefield potential. It can achieve operational effects 
generally associated with weapons of mass destruction (such as nuclear 
warheads). Information warfare can be seen as central to the ongoing revolution 
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in military affairs. Fast information flow and communication are elements crucial 
to this form of warfare. Since almost all of the systems include high-density 
semiconductors, the proposed e-bomb is a weapon that effectively attacks the 
hardware that makes information warfare possible. 
It can be said that the current MTR is based on the microchip. This 
incredibly improving technology is the base for possible rapid transmission and 
assimilation of operational data. High-resolution sensors, precision guidance 
capabilities for weapons and delivery platforms, and high-speed command, 
control and communications are some examples for the military applications 
associated with the microchip (Franck and Hildebrandt, 1996). The Network 
Centric Warfare is also another way of fighting in the future. Sensors, speed of 
command, data links, computerized planning systems, radios, and aircrafts are 
some of the elements that characterize the NCW. The common feature of these 
elements is that they all involve microchip technology, which makes them 
vulnerable to the proposed hypothetical e-bomb. That is, the proposed e-bomb is 
a potential threat against the Network Centric Warfare. Even though it may not 
disable the entire network, it may degrade the speed of operational tempo, 
temporarily or permanently disable some elements in the network, and, as a 
result, decrease the overall network richness significantly. 
One of the principal elements of the war, maneuver, is based on 
enhancing mobility on both offensive and defensive capabilities (Schneider and 
Grinter, 1998). Note that the proposed e-bomb is more likely the HPM weapon 
with a high degree of employment flexibility. The disadvantages of HPM 
weapons, such as limited potential lethality range, heavy size etc., can be 
overcome in proposed e-bomb designs.  
Almost every era of military history has featured a major/dominant 
weapon. That is, the country that has this weapon is most likely the dominant 
military power. This fact will not change in the future. The future battlefield 
requires conventional weapons to integrate with the command and control 
systems. Command and control systems do not accomplish anything by 
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themselves. However, even dominant conventional weapons will probably not be 
useful without capable command and control systems. That is, if one country can 
degrade the opponent’s command and control systems, the opponent country will 
not be able to benefit from its conventional weapons superiority. The proposed  
e-bomb can greatly degrade command and control systems, which, in turn, would 
degrade the usefulness of conventional weapons. 
HEMP is widely believed to render most allied space assets inert. As 
shown above, our notional e-bomb can appear similar to a HEMP weapon (within 
the atmosphere). Even though the cost of each individual electromagnetic 
weapon proposed in this study is assumed to be equal, one can easily say that 
our notional e-bomb will be less expensive, perhaps small, relative to HEMP. The 
design and technology for an e-bomb is also expected to be simpler and easier 
than those in the HEMP.  
Even if the effects of nuclear weapons continue to be the most important 
element in future military rivalries, with HEMP being a nuclear weapon intended 
for electronic devices, the proposed e-bomb can be as significant as HEMP, and 
thus be an important factor in military affairs. 
As Cheng Mengxiong, from the Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering, 
mentioned, HPM weapons must be considered a key future development in the 
military technical revolution since they have potential to destroy the opponent’s 
electronic systems. Because of size and design, HPM weapons are likely to be 
used primarily for defensive purposes. On the other hand, the proposed e-bomb 
is identified as an HPM weapon that can be used for offensive purposes. It must 
be noted that, if HPM weapons are considered a key future development in MTR, 
the proposed e-bomb can have more impact than HPM weapons. 
In this study, three types of e-bomb have been proposed. The purpose is 
to show that even though one does not have deep engineering capabilities, it is 
possible to produce an e-bomb by using commercially available devices. Maybe 
this weapon will not be militarily significant, but it generates more power than the 
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upset/damage threshold level of unshielded civilian systems. This makes such 
weapons quite interesting for terrorists. If this continues to be a major threat, the 
appearance of operational e-bombs will also prepare military powers to improve 
defensive measures against such weapons — even if the first e-bombs are small 
and unsophisticated. 
In the previous section, three aspects of military revolution were 
introduced: Defense, Technology, and Management. One can ask, “What is the 
role of e-bomb in these aspects?” The e-bomb does not have anything to do, at 
least directly, with the defense-management aspect. On the other hand, 
information warfare and network centric warfare are said to fall in the defense-
technology category. As mentioned before, since the proposed e-bomb is most 
likely to be a major threat in future warfare (information warfare and network 
centric warfare), it will degrade the effectiveness of the defense-technology leg of 
opponent’s military technical revolution. While it degrades the defense-
technology leg of the opponent’s military technical revolution, the innovation of e-
bombs will be a contribution to the technology-management leg of our military 
technical revolution, since technology innovation, development of appropriate 
technology etc., falls into this category. The scenario can be vice versa. An 
opponent can produce an e-bomb. In this case, the countermeasures against the 
opponent’s move in the military technical revolution must be considered and 
pursued. 
The next consideration of the proposed e-bomb is the role in responding 
to opposing military capability. Three approaches have been introduced: 
emulating, offsetting, and bypassing — if the opponent has taken a major 
innovative lead, and our country has chosen to respond. The e-bomb innovation 
does not fall into the emulating category (unless the opponent has developed it 
first). It can be an important offsetting measure, however, since it can negate the 
opponent’s electronic systems. On the other hand, the innovation of the e-bomb 
can also be considered as a kind of bypassing response — a menu that includes  
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developing new means of warfare to leapfrog the rival’s capabilities. From this 
perspective, the proposed e-bomb is potentially a key element in future military 
rivalries. 
Finally, it has been noted that improving technology in conventional 
weapons will be a big threat to our environment and to all humanity. This leads 
people to explore new ways of war that will be effective against electronic 
systems, but will not impact human life. Another issue is the increasing cost of 
conventional weapons. That is, future battles will be different, with nonlethal 
weapons becoming increasingly important. Nonlethality and the (relatively) low 
cost features of proposed e-bomb make it a reasonable and acceptable weapon 
of the future. 
Overall, the potential effectiveness of e-bombs implies that significant 
military advantages will likely accrue to those who first develop and deploy such 
weapons. 
D. THE IMPLICATION OF E-BOMB FOR THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES 
The official website of Turkish General Staff defines the missions and the 
responsibilities of the Turkish Armed Forces as: 
The Turkish Armed Forces’ missions and responsibilities are clearly 
stated in the Turkish Constitution and determined by law. In this 
context, the small but flexible units, having sufficient capability 
equipped with technological weapons and systems, comprising 
sufficient command-control assets, precise and developed 
ammunition, covering early warning assets and also able to 
conduct operation in any weather conditions, are very desirable and 
take priority in the new approach. 
To achieve this, importance and prioritization are assigned to the 
establishment of multifunctional units capable of conducting various 
tasks. 
In the current political-military-strategic environment where the 
global and regional balances have yet not been fully formed, the 
Turkish Armed Forces must be capable of ensuring security of the 
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Turkish homeland, as well as contributing to regional and global 
peace and stability. Accordingly, the Turkish Armed Forces aim at 
maintaining or improving the following capabilities: 
• deterrence of military power, 
• Command, control, communication, computer, intelligence,  
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, 
• superior maneuver capability and fire power,  
• Equipped with high tech weapons and systems, 
• Ability to conduct operations  day and night, 
• Air/missile defense and NBC protection capability against 
the mass destruction weapons, 
• Ability to conduct joint and combined operations, 
• interoperability with the armed forces of the allies, 
• Ability to conduct various type operations such as peace 
support, counter terrorism, disasters relief, crisis 
management, small scale strikes, blockade, embargo, 
humanitarian aid, control of refugee flow etc. as well as 
conventional war (Turkish General Staff, 2008). 
Multifunctionality is identified, above, as an important aspect of achieving 
these capabilities. The e-bomb can contribute to the required multifunctionality of 
the Turkish Armed Forces due to the battlefield effects of the e-bomb. Other 
issues, such as increasing capability of C4ISR systems, having high-technology 
weapons and systems, and counterterrorism, are also directly affected by the 
capabilities offered by the proposed e-bomb. 
The implication of the proposed e-bomb for the Turkish Armed Forces 
should be fully assessed in accordance with the missions and responsibilities 
defined in the Turkish Constitution. 
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1. Support Strategic/Operational/Tactical Levels of War  
In the near future, a significant challenge for the Turkish Armed Forces is 
to define a doctrine for using electromagnetic bombs and determining how it can 
best be incorporated into current systems and methods. It has been shown that 
the e-bomb is capable of creating effects across strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of war. The benefits of this integration might lead to more effective 
strategies and tactics for the Turkish Armed Forces.  
The proposed e-bomb can be a revolutionary technology. Tactically, such 
weapons can disrupt or disable an opponent’s electronic assets. Even though the 
effective weapon’s radius is limited up to 10-20 km, e-bomb range can be 
enhanced up to 150-200 km with appropriate missile design. This will add new 
combat capability to small and flexible Turkish units. As a result, tactical aircrafts 
(manned or unmanned) equipped with e-bombs, are likely to be more capable 
than units equipped with traditional conventional weapons systems. 
At the operational and strategic levels of war, the Network Centric Warfare 
and Information Warfare will play an important role for both allies and opponents. 
A weapon like the proposed e-bomb, which can be used against the enemy’s 
operational and strategic command assets, will accordingly be an important 
weapon.  
Likewise, when it is getting more and more difficult to separate the “good” 
and “bad” people, the nonlethality of e-bombs could help Turkish Armed Forces 
undertake peacekeeping missions while minimizing impact on human life. In 
addition, e-bombs can minimize the numbers of weapons employed while 
decreasing the collateral damage. This allows the administration of effective 
strategic strike operations against buried targets or targets that are located in 
civilian-populated areas. 
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2. Homeland Security 
Mobile e-bombs, which deliver their power into the enemy’s system at the 
speed of light, might also increase the defense capability against fast moving and 
maneuvering multiple targets that threaten the Turkish borders by decreasing 
their reaction time to the e-bomb. When the terror threat is considered, and 
simplicity in design allows terrorists to build such weapons, Turkish Armed 
Forces should consider the e-bomb as a threat to homeland security and develop 
new defensive concepts.  
Turkey’s geostrategic position requires the Turkish Armed Forces to react 
fast and engage rapidly against multiple targets. E-bombs might give both the 
area coverage and precise accuracy to prevent hostile attacks on the Turkish 
borders.  
3. Low Operational Cost 
The major problem of developing next generation conventional weapons is 
the increasing cost for production and supportability. This may also be a problem 
that the Turkish Armed Forces face. Although research and development of an        
e-bomb requires major investments, the costs in production and operating & 
support phases of proposed e-bomb might be quite less than for conventional 
weapons. “For example, in the case of a defense against missiles, shots from 
directed-energy weapons might cost around $8,000, whereas conventional 
missiles could cost hundreds of thousands of dollars or even millions of dollars, 
depending on their types” (Deveci, 2007). This provides a great advantage in life 
cycle cost while providing same effect on enemy’s electronic systems. 
4. Superior Information Warfare 
The e-bomb has potential to be a major threat against the electronic 
systems that are key elements in information warfare (Figure 65). The use of     
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e-bombs may give the Turkish Armed Forces the capability to limit its enemy’s 
ability to control and command their military forces. 
Turkish Armed Forces could use the e-bomb to attack and disable enemy 
aircraft, ground and air control systems, communication devices, radars, and air 
defense systems. In addition, it may be used to attack enemy commercial radio 
and television stations, which make anti-propagation, to limit their information 
network capabilities.  
 
 
Figure 65.   Damage and Destroy Enemy Information Systems (Deveci, 2007) 
 
5. How E-Bombs Benefit Turkish Land Forces 
E-bombs may change capabilities of the Turkish Land Forces both 
defensively and offensively. Any Turkish Land Forces unit equipped with an       
e-bomb might engage in a new way of war — with significant operational 
advantages over nations equipped with conventional weapons only. 
Communications and command systems are key elements in C4ISR 
systems for land warfare as well. Such systems are one of the first targets 
attacked in order to limit the opponent’s operations. The Turkish Armed Forces 
could use e-bombs to mount an effective attack against an enemy’s C4ISR 
systems.  
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Integrating e-bombs into the existing land warfare doctrine might also 
increase the accuracy and volume of the Turkish Land Forces’ fire in more 
complex and diverse environments. As seen from the latest land warfare 
developments, the probability of fighting in urban areas is increasing. Because 
civilian involvement and collateral damage are also increasing, conventional 
weapons in such an environment might be hard to use. This leads to increased 
importance for precise and tunable weapons. Turkish Land Forces may use the 
proposed e-bomb, with its nonlethality feature, against a wide range of targets. 
E-bomb-equipped helicopters or unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) could 
provide close air support for the Turkish Army. In this aspect, such platforms 
might target critical command, control, and communication (C3) capabilities, 
sensors and weapon guidance systems.  
The Turkish Land Forces will remain an important component for the 
national strategy and when enhanced with proposed e-bombs, equipped Turkish 
Land Forces units would gain a decisive advantage over other nations’ armies, 
which do not take the importance of this future weapon into account. 
6. How E-Bombs Benefit Turkish Naval Forces 
Turkey is bordered on three sides by seas: the Black Sea, Aegean Sea, 
and Mediterranean Sea. This makes the sea power a critical component of 
national security. Being equipped with proposed e-bomb could enhance the 
Turkish Naval Forces’ ability to execute its missions.  
Some of the possible threats for today’s naval forces have been defined 
by the Royal Institution of Naval Architects as: 
• Aircraft attack 
• Ship-based or land-based helicopters 
• Ship-based or land-based UAVs  
• Ship-launched or submarine-launched anti-ship missiles (ASM)  
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• Surface ship gunfire  
• Torpedoes 
• Mines (Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 2004) 
The greatest threat to the Turkish Naval Forces is probably anti-ship 
missiles (ASMs). Even though use of e-bombs is theoretically possible, it may be 
more complex in practice. However, the best defense against an opponent’s 
missile-equipped platforms is to disable the delivering platform.  In this aspect, 
the use of e-bombs may be a good defensive measure since it can degrade the 
effectiveness of ASM delivering platforms such as aircraft and ship-based/land-
based helicopters. In addition, the defense of a ship will be limited to several 
threat/missiles. That is, if the enemy attacks with more than that number at the 
same time, the ship will not be able to react/defense against all of them. In such 
a scenario, the e-bomb may provide great advantage as well, since it makes 
more difficult the orchestration of saturation missile attacks. In addition to these 
threats, the most susceptible segments of naval ships are high-technology 
communication, sensor, and navigation systems. The proposed e-bomb may also 
be a new way of fighting against these systems aboard enemy ships. 
In the maritime environment, e-bombs might have limitations due to the 
limited speed of naval ships. The employment of e-bombs on missiles seems the 
best solution for naval ships. This requires e-bombs loaded onboard. The 
complexity of coupling and potential lethality may preclude e-bombs being a 
superior alternative to conventional weapons. 
However, the implication of e-bombs for Turkish Naval Forces may well 
provide extraordinary advantages as long as their inherit limitations are well 
understood. A combination of both e-bombs and conventional weapons is likely 
the best solution for the Turkish Navy.  
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7. How E-Bombs Benefit the Turkish Air Forces 
Turkish Air Forces seem to be the component of the Armed Forces on 
which the proposed e-bomb might have the greatest impact – in both the air-to-
air battle and the air-to-ground battle.  
The number of missiles that an aircraft can carry limits air-to-air 
engagements (Thompson and Goure, 2003). Instead of having a limited payload, 
e-bomb-equipped Turkish fighter aircraft might be effective against numerous air 
targets. This is likewise a major advance in Suppression of Enemy Air Defense 
(SEAD) operations. In the beginning of any war, defeating opponent’s air defense 
system is highly important. The anti-radiation missile is commonly used by the 
aircraft in such operations. Since an e-bomb has the potential to defeat multiple 
air defense systems, the capability gained by the e-bomb would be a major 
development for Turkish Air Forces.  
The advantage of e-bomb gained for air-to-air battle is similar to that for 
Turkish Naval Forces. When there are several aircraft as a threat, the multiplier 
effect of the proposed e-bomb would enhance capabilities to defeat the threat. In 
addition, the speed and maneuver limit for the Turkish Naval Forces can be 
compensated for through the much greater speed of Turkish Air Force assets. 
This makes different e-bomb employment methods such as bomb, glide bomb, 
etc., useful for Turkish Air Forces aircrafts. 
As mentioned before, e-bombs are not yet mature, but they offer 
increasing capabilities for all levels of war. The country that can explore the 
benefits of such weapons and make investments in research can reap important 
advantages against military rivals. Therefore, it is time to seriously consider 













THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 151
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Victory is for those who can say, "Victory is mine.” Success is for 
those who can begin saying, "I will succeed," and say, "I have 
succeeded" in the end. 
— Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, The founder and the first president of 
the Turkish Republic 
 
The directed-energy weapons have matured in many areas and are 
considered a major technical revolution in the twenty-first century. Such weapons 
are expected to play an important role in the battlefield of the future, both in 
defensive and offensive aspect. The hypothetical e-bomb that is proposed in this 
study is introduced as one of the directed energy weapon of the future. The 
proposed e-bomb is intended to be used as an offensive weapon rather than a 
defensive weapon.  
In this thesis, three classes of the hypothetical e-bomb were proposed, 
and a theoretical simulation was generated to show the characteristics of each 
hypothetical e-bomb. The high-power microwave theory was used to simulate 
such weapon. The simulation results showed that such weapons are able to 
generate power levels that are more than known upset or permanently damage 
levels of electronic devices and systems when used against appropriate targets. 
The coupling of generated field strength into the target is more complex than the 
way explained in this study and depends on many parameters. However, a basic 
coupling estimate showed that the hypothetical e-bomb has a militarily 
reasonable potential lethality range depending on shielding effectiveness of the 
targets.  
Another interesting result of the simulation is that commercially available 
technology for such a weapon is sufficiently mature to be a significant threat in 
many areas. Especially, low-tech and medium-tech e-bombs involve devices that 
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can be found easily and do not require deep engineering knowledge. This makes 
such weapons quite interesting for everyone. Once the terrorists explore these 
weapons and the simplicity of them, the asymmetric threat of the future will 
probably have new dimension.  
There are still some issues which must be addressed in the designing and 
application of such weapons and engineering research must continue to 
overcome these challenges. Such research include simplifying the complexity of 
hypothetical e-bomb, decreasing the size, increasing power, and finding the most 
appropriate delivery method that gives maximum range. However, the 
development of e-bomb for military applications is expected to continue, and, in 
the near future, countries will implement this weapon in compact sizes and will 
develop new defensive concepts against such weapons.  
In this study, including the technical aspect of hypothetical e-bomb, the 
effectiveness and the role in military rivalry were assessed as well. A measure of 
effectiveness model was developed in order to compare electromagnetic 
weapons. The model results showed that the proposed e-bomb has a potential to 
be as effective as HEMP that is known as “the nuclear bomb for electronic 
devices.” Since there is no e-bomb officially reported in open literature and not 
enough qualitative data to compare such weapons, the proposed measure of 
effectiveness model mostly depends on the qualitative measures defined by the 
author of this study. Even though the model itself represents a good comparison 
model for the effectiveness of electromagnetic weapons, it surely needs more 
quantitative data to be more realistic. Future development in this area and data 
that can be obtained after the implementation of such weapons in the battlefield 
will provide enough data that is required to make more realistic effectiveness 
comparison. In addition, there is not open literature that provides cost data for 
such weapons. Again, when the cost data is obtained in the future, or a 
reasonable cost estimation for such weapons is made, more realistic cost-
effectiveness analysis will provide a better approach for the decision makers. 
However, one can sense that the e-bomb will be less expensive than other 
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electromagnetic weapons because of its size and technological simplicity. This 
makes the hypothetical e-bomb an attractive area for research and development 
investments.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Turkish Armed Forces will 
remain committed to the development and deployment of technologically 
advanced systems to be ready for the uncertainties of future battlefield. In this 
aspect, the special features gained by the proposed e-bomb will clearly be a 
force multiplier and provide opportunities to improve the Turkish Armed Forces’ 
operational capabilities in diversity of mission areas. This will lead the Turkish 
Armed Forces to take advantage in military rivalry. On the other hand, failure to 
develop and understand the proposed e-bomb might be a big threat for the 
Turkish Armed Forces in the future since the threat will be a new unknown face 
of future battlefield. In contrast, this will weaken the Turkish Armed Forces’ 
military power and war-fighting ability that results in staying behind in military 
rivalry.  
As a result, the Turkish Armed Forces might need to explore the 
technological countermeasures against the potential e-bomb in the battlefield of 
the future before facing an opponent that is equipped with these weapons.  
This thesis concludes with several recommendations for the Turkish 
Armed Forces as it considers the possibility of implementation of an e-bomb. 
• Technological advantage gained by the proposed e-bomb might 
give the Turkish Armed Forces new capabilities to deal with the 
diverse threats in its geostrategic position. This advantage might be 
attained by investing in developing the proposed e-bomb. 
• Referring to the mission of the Turkish Armed Forces for supporting 
the global peace and conducting operations for peacekeeping, the 
nonlethality feature of a hypothetical e-bomb might be a useful 
weapon since it offers a new way of war that degrades opponent’s 
electronic systems while making no damaging harm on humans. 
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This might also minimize the personnel injury that is expected to be 
more in an operation conducted by the conventional weapons. 
• Considered that future battles will involve a new ways of war such 
as Information Warfare and Network Centric Warfare, the Turkish 
Armed Forces might explore the key factors that will play an 
important role in this new battlefield. The research and 
development of a proposed e-bomb might be a beneficial 
investment for the Turkish Armed Forces since it offers a notable 
threat against command and control systems, computer systems, 
communication devices etc., which are the main sensors and 
systems in Information Warfare and Network Centric Warfare. 
• With optimal cost-effective investments, the Turkish Armed Forces 
could establish a joint organization to research the e-bomb with the 
participation of the national universities and national scientific 
research institutes. Such organization might have overall 
responsibility for the engineering and production phases of these 
weapons, which would help to accelerate the innovation of e-bomb 
technology. This might also help the civilian contractors to 
contribute in defense business and lead similar applications in 
different areas. 
• The increasing cost of conventional weapons is more likely to be a 
big problem in the future. Even though such weapons provide a big 
advantage on the battlefield, the expected increasing cost in 
production, and operating and support phases will make them 
difficult to maintain for the whole life cycle. The lower cost and the 
multiplier effect of the proposed e-bomb might be a better option 
that may give the same effectiveness as conventional weapons for 
the Turkish Armed Forces. 
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• The Turkish Armed Forces should improve the strategies and 
doctrines to fight in a directed-energy environment that involves 
proposed e-bombs. This would include special hardening 
techniques that will provide shielding effectiveness for command 
and control systems, important communication systems, vital data 
links and other strategically and tactically important systems 
against proposed e-bombs. As a result, this new concept would 
increase the survivability and recoverability of the Turkish Armed 
Forces in the battlefield of the future.  
• The military rivalry is an ongoing event and will never be over. To 
be among the leading countries or to be behind other countries in 
the military rivalry of today does not mean that it will be the same in 
the future battlefield. Nevertheless, there is a reality that the leading 
countries who will achieve the military technical revolution in 
military rivalry will have the power to shape the world as they intend 
to do. No matter which place Turkey is located in military rivalry 
today, it should explore the key elements of the future battlefield to 
get the leading place among other countries. In the context 
explained in this study, the proposed e-bomb has the potential to 
be a part of the military technical revolution for the battlefield of the 
future. From this perspective, the Turkish Armed Forces should 
benefit from this opportunity by investing in e-bomb research and 
development. 
In conclusion, the proposed hypothetical e-bombs offer new, relatively 
inexpensive, technologically possible designs that might be well worth the effort 
in military utility. The Turkish Armed Forces should invest in e-bomb research 
and development (R&D) to improve its combat capabilities in the battlefield of the 
future. This will enhance the capability of Turkish Armed Forces to secure the 
borders of Turkey against internal and external threats as well as the contribution 
to regional and global peace. Eventually, the proposed e-bomb will be a key 
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element in contemporary military-technical revolution that will shape the 
battlefield of the future. The sooner Turkey begins to invest in the development of 
an e-bomb, the better position Turkey will take in future military rivalry, and the 





 A. RECTANGULAR WAVEGUIDE SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 
Official Designations 
Band 






(RCSC) U.S. (EIA)** 
 0.32 - 0.49 23.0 x 11.50 584.20 x 292.10 R3 WG00 WR2300 
 0.35 - 0.53 21.0 x 10.5 533.40 x 266.70 R4 WG0 WR2100 
 0.41 - 0.625 18.0 x 9.0 457.20 x 228.60 R5 WG1 WR1800 
 0.49 - 0 75 15.0 x 7.5 381.0 x 191.0 R6 WG2 WR1500 
 0.64 - 0.96 11.5 x 5.75 292.10 x 146.05 R8 WG3 WR1150 
 0.75 - 1.12 9.75 x 4.875 247.65 x 123.83 R9 WG4 WR975 
 0.96 - 1.45 7.7 x 3.85 195.58 x 97.79 R12 WG5 WR770 
 1.12 - 1.7 6.5 x 3.25 165.10 x 82.55 R14 WG6 WR650 
 1.45 - 2.2 5.1 x 2.55 129.54 x 64.77 R18 WG7 WR510 
 1.7 - 2.6 4.3 x 2.15 109.22 x 54.61 R22 WG8 WR430 
 2.2 - 3.3 3.4 x 1.7 86.36 x 43.18 R26 WG9A WR340 
 2.6 - 3.95 2.84 x 1.34 72.14 x 34.04 R32 WG10 WR284 
 3.3 - 4.9 2.29 x 1.145 58.17 x 29.08 R40 WG11A WR229 
 3.95 - 5.85 1.872 x 0.872 47.55 x 22.15 R48 WG12 WR187 
 4.9 - 7.05 1.59 x 0.759 40.39 x 20.19 R58 WG13 WR159 
 5.85 - 8.2 1.372 x 0.622 34.84 x 15.80 R70 WG14 WR137 
 7.05 - 10.0 1.122 x 0.497 28.50 x 12.62 R84 WG15 WR112 
X 8.2 - 12.4 0.9 x 0.4 22.86 x 10.16 R100 WG16 WR90 
 10.0 - 15.0 0.75 x 0.375 19.05 x 9.53 R120 WG17 WR75 
KU 12.4 - 18.0 0.622 x 0.311 15.80 x 7.9 R140 WG18 WR62 
 15.0 - 22.0 0.510 x 0.255 12.95 x 6.48 R180 WG19 WR51 
K 18.0 - 26.5 0.420 x 0.170 10.67 x 4.32 R220 WG20 WR42 
 22.0 - 33.0 0.340 x 0.170 8.64 x 4.32 R260 WG21 WR34 
Ka 26.5 - 40.0 0.280 x 0.140 7.11 x 3.56 R320 WG22 WR28  
Q 33.0 - 50.0 0.224 x 0.112 5.69 x 2.84 R400 WG23  WR22 
 40.0 - 60.0 0.188 x 0.094 4.78 x 2.388 R500 WG24 WR19 
V 50.0 - 75.0 0.148 x 0.074 3.759 x 1.879 R620 WG25 WR15 
E 60.0 - 90.0 0.122 x 0.061 3.099 x 1.549 R740 WG26 WR12 
W 75.0 - 110.0 0.100 x 0.050 2.54 x 1.27 R900 WG27 WR10 
F 90.0 - 140.0 0.080 x 0.040 2.032 x 1.016 R1200 WG28 WR8 
D 110.0 - 170.0 0.065 x 0.0325 1.651 x 0.8255  WG29 WR7 










(RCSC) U.S. (EIA)** 
 170.0 - 260.0 0.043 x 0.0215 1.0922 x 0.5461  WG31 WR4 




A. MATLAB SIMULATION MODEL OUTPUT PLOTS FOR LOW-TECH     
E-BOMB 




















E-field strength of E-bomb (lossless)
 




















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
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E-field strength of E-bomb in the rain
 





























Average power density of E-bomb
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Energy density of E-bomb
 





























Average power density of E-bomb in the rain
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Energy density of E-bomb in the rain
 






















Flowing current delivered into unshielded target system
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Flowing current delivered into target system in the rain
 

















































































































































B MATLAB SIMULATION MODEL OUTPUT PLOTS FOR MEDIUM-TECH 
E-BOMB 


















E-field strength of E-bomb (lossless)
 


















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
 
 167


















E-field strength of E-bomb in the rain
 

























Average power density of E-bomb
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Energy density of E-bomb
 

























Average power density of E-bomb in the rain
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Energy density of E-bomb in the rain
 

























Flowing current delivered into unshielded target system
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Flowing current delivered into target system in the rain
 

























































































































































C. MATLAB SIMULATION MODEL OUTPUT PLOTS FOR HIGH-TECH E-
BOMB 

















E-field strength of E-bomb (lossless)
 

















E-field strength of E-bomb with atmospheric loss
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E-field strength of E-bomb in the rain
 
























Average power density of E-bomb
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Energy density of E-bomb
 
























Average power density of E-bomb in the rain
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Energy density of E-bomb in the rain
 



























Flowing current delivered into unshielded target system
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Flowing current delivered into target system in the rain
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